Status versus content: Dysfunctional paradigms of the constitutional right to a free press based on a six-factor classification matrix in the American law of defamation

This dissertation explores the constitutional conflict between the First Amendment freedom of the press and the implied right of privacy. Specifically, it examines the conflict between free press and defamation law and the two models--or paradigms--of analysis used in American political science and constitutional law for resolving this conflict.;The first of these models is based on the status of the defamation victim. Through this model, a body of literature has evolved to balance the rights of a public free press against the privacy rights of a defamed person based on whether that person has been endowed with a "public" or "private" status.;The second model is based on the content of the communication claimed to be constitutionally protected. This approach separates communication in public and nonpublic matters for the purpose of determining if a libel has occurred.;This dissertation defines four status factors and two content factors which constitute these two models. The factors are crossed and matched with one another on a six-factor matrix to reveal dysfunctional paradigms and an inherent problem in reconciling personal rights under the United States Constitution.