| The outbreak of a crisis of sovereign insolvency in the 1980's was the result of a series of interactions between foreign creditors and sovereign debtors, and a deterioration in the global economic environment. The response chosen to deal with the problem emerged from a process of consultations among commercial bank creditors, governments of the Group of Seven western advanced industrialized nations, and international financial institutions, with limited participation by debtor states.;The measures devised to deal with this crisis, depart in significant ways from responses to previous outbreaks of sovereign insolvency, and from contemporary responses to comparable situations in domestic law. The recent sovereign debt restructuring arrangements have consistently shown a solicitude for the interests of creditors, but are far less satisfactory from the perspective of debtors. In particular the debt restructuring arrangements of the last decade have systematically disregarded legal doctrines, principles, and practices which would normally apply in favour of debtors. Consequently, the legal foundations of these measures are precarious.;The most serious shortcoming of these arrangements from a legal perspective is the striking absence of neutrality in the resolution of conflicting interests in the contemporary situation of sovereign insolvency. The bias in favour of creditors is a problem which needs to be overcome. |
