THAI-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1950-1954

This monograph examines the motives for the alliance between Thailand and the United States during the period 1950-1954 in the context of the Cold War era. With the extension of the Cold War from Europe into Southeast Asia, the American and Thai governments concluded economic and military assistance agreements in 1950; and in 1954 the two nations joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). These developments shaped the course of Thai-American relations in the next two decades.;Examination of the record reveals that globalist foreign policy and preventive diplomacy were the major reasons why the United States came to perceive a security interest in Thailand. In order to prevent Thailand from becoming a falling domino, the administration of Harry S Truman provided military and economic aid to Thailand. To a great extent the policies of the administrations of Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower form a continuum. The intensification of the First Indochinese War convinced America to take the initiative in the formation of SEATO.;For Thailand, Prime Minister P. Phibulsonggram believed that Thai security was in danger because of its geographic position and its subversive minorities. Phibulsonggram's alignment with the United States was the result of his quest for security and stability. However, his considerations for security were far greater than considerations for stability. The Cold War struggle caused the Chinese/communist threat to be perceived as stronger than ever because Thailand had an historical fear of both Chinese and communists.;The present work is based on a variety of recently available declassified documents from the Department of State, the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the Harry S Truman and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Libraries. Thai materials available in the United States were also consulted.;This study attempts to create a comprehensive picture of Thai-American relations previously known only in their general outlines. It is also an effort to fill some gaps in the knowledge of the policies of both nations during the period 1950-1954.