THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION IN ITS DECISIONS AFFECTING CHURCH-RELATED ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS DURING THE FIRST THREE QUARTERS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Between 1908 and 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down 18 substantive decisions affecting church-related elementary and secondary schools. The cases fall into two categories: government regulation and tax funding. The purpose of this dissertation is to study the issue of religious freedom in this stream of litigation.; Considered collectively in three chronological segments, the cases pertained to three leading questions. The Court answered part of the first between 1908 and 1927: May government abridge the fundamental rights of parents, students, and schools? In Quick Bear v. Leupp (1908), petitioners challenged the right of Indians to finance Catholic schools with their own tribal funds. The Court backed the Indian claim. During the 1920s, Nebraska and Hawaii enacted laws which interferred with the curriculum and the administration of private schools. Oregon tried to abolish the schools by law. In Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), and Farrington v. Tokushige (1927), the Court voided all this legislation.; Three cases decided between 1930 and 1968 revealed a radically different concern: May government assist parents, students, and schools? The Court responded with a qualified affirmative, allowing limited tax-funded services to students, but not to their schools. In Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education (1930) and Board of Education v. Allen (1968), it allowed tax-funded textbooks. In Everson v. Board of Education (1947), it allowed tax-funded transportation.; The cases of the 1970s raised parallel issues of measure and method concerning government regulation and public funding. In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), the Court ruled that Wisconsin could not require Amish children to attend school beyond the eighth grade. In Norwood v. Harrison (1973) and Runyon v. McCrary (1976), the Court found racial discrimination in some private schools and moved to outlaw it. In Wheeler v. Barrera (1974), it ruled that states accepting participation in federally-funded programs must observe federal requirements which mandate services to all students.; After 1970 appellants asked what measure and method of funding the Court would allow. The Court rejected all new funding provisions in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty (1973), Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist (1973), Sloan v. Lemon (1973), and Meek v. Pittenger (1975). In these decisions, a Pennsylvania textbook program was the only surviving legislation (1975) until the Court validated four of six Ohio provisions in Wolman v. Walter (1977): e.g. secular textbooks and workbooks, standardized testing and scoring, diagnosis of speech and hearing defects, and treatment of the same at "neutral" sites.; Since 1947, the Court based all funding decisions on a prevailing interpretation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment. During the 1970s, it ruled on the basis of three tests of constitutionality: (1) primary secular purpose, (2) an effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) excessive entanglement of government in religious affairs. Under these tests, the majority of the justices adopted a policy of rigor which generated an increasingly vigorous dissent within the Court. Dissenting votes increased from one in 1971 to three in 1975. In their opinions, the dissenters pointed out inadequacies in the Court's perception of the church, the schools, the role of religion in schooling, and the concept of government neutrality. They objected to several inconsistencies in judicial policy. With respect to constitutional doctrine, they made two fundamental suggestions: (1) that the Court give to claims based on the free exercise clause of the First Amendment more recognition than it has in the past; and (2) that it grant due consideration to the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees, especially equal protection.