The effect of shareholder rights and information asymmetry on option-related repurchase activity

I investigate the effect of shareholder rights and information asymmetry on option-related repurchase activity. Prior research shows that the dilution effect of the exercise of the employee stock options on earnings per share (EPS) decreases the value of stock options. Thus, managers tend to use stock repurchases rather than dividends to return cash to shareholders (the dividend substitution effect). I document that the executive stock option incentives to repurchase stock as a substitute for dividends are stronger when firms have weak shareholder rights and the level of information asymmetry positively influences managerial stock option incentives to repurchase stock. Furthermore, prior research indicates that information asymmetry is positively associated with stock repurchases. I also provide evidence indicating that the relationship between information asymmetry and stock repurchases is stronger when firms have weaker shareholder rights. My study fills a gap in research on dividend substitution research, suggesting that managerial stock option incentives to repurchase stock depend on shareholder rights and information asymmetry. Furthermore, I extend the analysis of information asymmetry in payout policy by exploring the degree in which the strength of shareholder rights influences this effect.