TRYING TO EXPLAIN THE SHERMAN ACT AND WARREN COURT ANTITRUST POLICY: EXCURSION INTO POLITICAL THEORY AND VALUES INVOLVED IN THE ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1958-69

This study examined the political theory and values underlying the antitrust policy of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren during the years 1958-1969. The doctrinal content of major antitrust decisions of that period were analyzed in light of the influence of internal and external pressures on the legal decision-making process. The historical development of antitrust law, demands of legal scholars for principled judicial decision-making, and external pressures exerted by Congress, the executive branch, economic theory and interest groups are placed in juxtaposition to the Supreme Court's decisions in the field. From this, conclusions are drawn concerning the Supreme Court's ideological function in the making of national economic policies.;Case study methods were employed in analyzing the Warren Court decisions, and primary and secondary source literature were relied upon to identify significant internal and external influences on decisions. Conclusions concerning the Court's ideological role as an antitrust policy-maker were drawn by examining the relationships between the political theory and values involved in the cases examined, and the internal and external pressures on the Court within the framework of a modified systems analysis.;The findings of this study indicate that the Warren Court's activism in the areas of civil rights and liberties is reflected in a pattern of protection of small business enterprise from the adverse effects of the economic activities of large-scale enterprise. This activism is viewed as a function of the Supreme Court's traditional role as a stabilizing force in the American political system. Activism on behalf of economically insecure enterprises served to maintain the functioning of a limited economic pluralism in various markets. The Warren Court's contribution to the maintenance of a pluralistic economy cast the Court into the role of social engineer balancing the competing antitrust values of efficiency against the populist value of a free and open market. The actual consequences of the Warren Court's activity as system stabilizer are viewed as doing little to alter the substantive character of American industrial organization. This finding suggests that the Court's role in economic policy-making is formal rather than substantive.