| This dissertation focuses on the relationship between the tools of war and the soldiers of the Canadian Corps who had to use them. As its title implies it follows the development of tactics and technology, whether in training, in so-called quiet times in the trenches, or in combat. Evidence of change can be seen in the marked contrast between the counter-attacks at Second Ypres, in 1915, when Canadian battalions walked or ran towards enemy positions as a mass, suffering heavy casualties as a result, and 1918, when Canadian platoons, under the cover of artillery barrages and using their own weapons as well as sophisticated tactics of fire and movement, measured their advance in miles instead of yards, though casualties were still heavy. Through government documents, personal diaries, published reminiscences, technical and training manuals, and secondary sources, the author follows the evolution of technology and of tactical thinking and practice, within the Canadian Militia before the war and the Canadian Contingent and Canadian Corps of the war years. Central to his discussion are such weapons as the Ross rifle, the Lee-Enfield, hand and rifle grenades, the Lewis machine gun, the Stokes mortar, and artillery. Also important are communications, the air war, the tactics of fire and movement, and the significance of training. He concludes that the improvement of tactics from 1915 to 1918 did not appreciably reduce casualties, but allowed battalions to capture more ground in each assault. Thus, from a commander's if not necessarily a soldier's point of view, fire and movement tactics were a success. |
