Essays in imperfect competition, information asymmetry and strategic trade policy

The dissertation consists of four closely-related and self-contained essays on imperfect competition, information asymmetry and strategic trade policy.; In the first core chapter international equity markets are integrated into the trade model of imperfect competition, based on the work of Dixit(Economic Journal, 1984). The extent of foreign ownership is shown to have definite implications for trade policies. It also affects the distribution of world welfare between countries. However, it turns out to have no effect on trade patterns and the values of firms. The second core chapter uses a variant of the Dixit model to analyze the effect of an export subsidy on the welfare of the importing country. This problem has been neglected in the received literature. An export subsidy is found to increase the importing country's welfare under fairly general conditions.; The final two chapters are related to uncertainty and information asymmetry. In the third core chapter a Direct Revelation Strategy is defined in the Bayes-Nash duopoly game with information asymmetry between firms about uncertain demand. The Direct Revelation Strategy turns out to be the dominant strategy of the informed firm and it is found to be implementable for a wide range of parameter values.; The last chapter examines optimal tariff policy of the importing country when the import-competing firm with information advantage adopts the Direct Revelation Strategy. The tariff proves to affect the behavioral pattern of the import-competing firm as well as the cost condition of the exporting firm.