CORPORATE INVOLVEMENT IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE DURING THE 1970S

This dissertation is concerned with two trends in the formation and proliferation of corporation political action committees (PACs) during the 1970s. First, why did corporate PACs grow so dramatically during the 1970s? Second, why did some major corporations choose to form a PAC during the past decade while others did not?;With respect to the second question, several economic and political variables were tested to ascertain their impact on the probability of a firm having formed a PAC by 1980. Three variables proved to be statistically significant in predicting whether or not a company formed a PAC: (1) Firm Size, (2) Industry Regulation and (3) Market Concentration. Using these results, as well as the findings of twenty-four personal interviews with corporate government relations managers, a typology of business involvement in campaign finance was developed. This typology ranks firms from least likely to most likely to have a PAC.;In the final chapter, the implications of these findings and directions for future research in the field of business-government relations are discussed.;With respect to the first question, it was found that during the 1970s corporations were provided with both the opportunity and incentive to form political action committees. The opportunity was given to corporations by way of several changes and clarifications in the federal laws regulating corporate involvement in campaign finance. The incentive to form PACs was provided through several factors including an increase in government intervention into the affairs of private industry, an augmented demand for campaign funds from politicians, a perception among many business leaders that the electoral initiatives of labor unions had to be offset, and pressure from business leaders who had formed PACs on those business leaders that had not. Together, these incentives along with the new opportunity help explain the dramatic rise in corporate PAC formation during the 1970s.