Forward and Spot Prices in Multi-Settlement Wholesale Electricity Markets

In organized wholesale electricity markets, power is sold competitively in a multi-unit multi-settlement single-price auction comprised of a forward and a spot market. This dissertation attempts to understand the structure of the forward premium in these markets, and to identify the factors that may lead forward and spot prices to converge or diverge.;These markets are unique in that the forward demand is price-sensitive, while spot residual demand is perfectly inelastic and must be met in full, a crucial design feature the literature often glosses over. An important contribution of this dissertation is the explicit modeling of each market separately in order to understand how generation and load choose to act in each one, and the consequences of these actions on equilibrium prices and quantities given that firms maximize joint profits over both markets.;In the first essay, I construct a two-settlement model of electricity prices in which firms that own asymmetric capacity-constrained units facing convex costs compete to meet demand from consumers, first in quantities, then in prices. I show that the forward premium depends on the costliness of spot production relative to firms' ability to exercise market power by setting quantities in the forward market.;In the second essay, I test the model from the first essay with unit-level capacity and marginal cost data from the California Independent System Operator (CAISO). I show that the model closely replicates observed price formation in the CAISO.;In the third essay, I estimate a time series model of the CAISO forward premium in order to measure the impact that virtual bidding has had on forward and spot price convergence in California between April 2009 and March 2014. I find virtual bidding to have caused forward and spot prices to diverge due to the large number of market participants looking to hedge against - or speculate on - the occurrence of infrequent but large spot price spikes by placing virtual demand bids.