Farmers' Green Manure Planting Practice And Its Incentive Mechanism

As a source of clean organic fertilizer,green manure not only has certain economic value in reducing fertilizer application and increasing crop yield,but also has more significant ecological value in improving soil fertility,promoting nutrient circulation and eliminating agricultural pollution.In China,with the deepening of agricultural modernization,the green production measures represented by planting green manure have been paid more and more attention by the government.However,as the main body of agricultural production and management,farmers are not very active in planting and using green manure.The structural contradiction of "hot on the top and cold on the bottom" in the promotion of green manure is prominent,which restricts the implementation of green manure policy and the realization of related agricultural environmental goals.How to break through this dilemma and promote rational farmers to actively participate in green manure planting practice?The answer to this question will provide a constructive policy reference for optimizing agricultural ecosystem and improving the quality of agricultural development.This dissertation is supported by the theory of farmer behavior(TFB),theory of social ecosystem(TSE),theory of externality and theory of consumer behavior(TCB).Based on the survey data of 1217 farmers and 974 urban consumers in southern China,this dissertation analyzed the process of farmers'green manure planting behaviors,and designed a combining study logic of "Have no intention——Have intentions——Put into action" and "Have intentions but no action——Have intentions and action".After that,the incentive mechanism of government incentive based on ecological compensation policy and market incentive based on premium price of consumer pay for Green-manure-rice(GMR)is constructed.Specifically,firstly,aiming at the non-ideal situation of farmers' unwilling to plant green manure,on the basis of SES and TPB frames respectively,the binary Logit model and the structural equation model(SEM)are used to explore the objective and subjective constraints of farmers'willingness.Based on the perspective of behavioral transformation,the internal mechanism of farmers'willingness to transform to behavior is studied.Secondly,in view of the non-ideal situation in which farmers have the planting intention but no actual behavior,binary Logit model and interpretative structure model(ISM)are used to test the consistent relationship between farmers' green manure planting intention and behavior,and to explore the occurrence mechanism of the contradiction between farmers' planting intention and behavior.Thirdly,from the perspective of government,the dissertation analyzed the willingness of farmers to receive ecological compensation from planting green manure and their preference for selecting compensation mode by adopting Double-hurdle model and MLR model respectively,and proposed the optimization strategy of compensation policy.From the perspective of the market,the two-stage-Heckman model is used to study consumers' willingness to pay premium for GMR,and to test the substitution effect of the market mechanism of consumers' premium payment for the government's ecological compensation policy and its effectiveness in encouraging farmers to plant green manure.Finally,the dissertation summarized the research results and constructed the system that drives the green manure planting behavior of farmers.The main research conclusions can be summarized as follows:first,under the current development mode,the economic value of green manure is low while the ecological value is high;second,over-regulation by the government is not conducive to guiding the farmers' intention to plant green manure,while positive perceived behavioral control and close social network are conducive to the transformation from intention to action;third,the lack of recognition of the value of green manure and the restriction of production conditions were the main causes of the contradiction between farmers'planting intention and behavior;fourth,ecological compensation is an effective policy tool to encourage farmers to plant green manure in the short term,but in the long run,the incentive effect of market mechanism is more sustainable;fifth,the premium payment mechanism of consumers for GMR can be a good substitute for the ecological compensation policy of the government and can be used as a long-term marketization scheme to encourage farmers to plant green manure.Based on the above research conclusions,an institutional system has been established to drive the green fertilizer planting behavior of farmers,including accessible behavior transformation conditions,appropriate government control system,optimized ecological compensation policy,rational consumer payment behavior and perfect market operation mechanism.The innovation of this paper is reflected in three aspects.First,a systematic research framework is established to explore the occurrence mechanism of farmers' green manure planting behavior.By deconstructing the occurrence process of farmers' behavior and constructing the systematic research logic combining "no willing-willing-having behavior" with "willing but no behavior-willing-having behavior",the driving factors of farmers' behavior has been explored from multiple perspectives.Second,the optimization strategy of ecological compensation for green manure planting was put forward.Through the exploration of ecological compensation standards,compensation methods and their influencing mechanisms,the optimization principle of "one benchmark,one adjustment" of compensation policy was determined,and a precise policy implementation plan was formulated.Third,it is verified that the profit-induced marketization scheme is an effective way to continuously stimulate farmers' green manure planting behavior.By measuring consumers' premium payment level and willingness to pay for GMR this paper tests the substitution of market mechanism of consumer premium on the effect of government ecological compensation policy,and preliminarily establishes the institutional arrangement of market scheme.