Legal System Study On The Profit Distribution And Delivery Of Wholly State-Owned Enterprises

Under the dual-interest relationship, the profit distribution and delivery of Wholly State-owned Enterprises'(WSOE) manifests the WSOE's Government-Enterprises relationship in the field of financial budget, which turns to be the outcome of financial system reformation in China. The dual-interest relationship is composed of two parts. One is financial benefits distribution relationship between the state and enterprises which determined by the financial budget management. The other is the distribution of property interests between enterprises and their shareholders which determined by the relationship between enterprises and their investors. The dual-interest relationship determines and influences the legal construction of profits distribution and delivery of WSOE directly. However, there are many problems and drawbacks in the current legal system because of the legislators'ignorance of the dual-interest relationship in this area.First of all, our financial system reformation has greatly contributed to the establishment of the dual-structure of finance, which leads to the co-existence of public budget and state-owned capital's operational budget. With the microcosmic profit distribution and delivery of WSOE taken account into the macroscopic system of the government financial budget, it is disclosed that the profit distribution and delivery of WSOE are of dual-interest relationship essentially: on the one hand, as the state being the unique shareholder of WSOE, the delivered profit must be included into the public budget; on the other hand, as the WSOE being the operational entity with legal personality and private-interest claims, it cannot completely follow the very approach to the public budget's management to solve the problem of profit distribution and delivery of WSOE.Secondly, with the continuously outspread experimental work on the state-owned capital's operational budget and the enactment of relevant statutes and rules, the enforcement of state-owned capital's operational budget has caused a fierce and wide argument in the legal field. With looking into the internal and essential reasons, we can find that legislators have not recognized the dual-interest relationship in the profit distribution and delivery of WSOE, and then a new type of relationship between the government and enterprises comes into existence. Therefore, the Ministry of Finance (MOF)'s solution which is“old bottles with new wine”in nature fails to settle the new problems and conflicts.Thirdly, there is a general problem in the current legal system that the current rules are too rigid and inflexible which are the character of the out-of-date rules before. The solution to the above problems must rely on considering all the parties'interests under the context of market economy. To overcome the system inflexibility, it is necessary to devise a flexible and practical legal system adaptable to the market economy.The thesis's structure is as follows:The thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter?analyses and summarizes the connection between the distribution of state-owned capital's profit and the public budget. Then,it continues to extend to the nature of the profit distribution and delivery of WSOE on the basis of looking into the history of the above distribution institution and the reform of our country's financial system. This chapter establishes the basic perspective of the thesis. Chapter?introduces the dual-interest relationship in profit distribution and delivery of WSOE which specializes the state-owned capital's operational budget, then continues to propose to establish a legal system for profit distribution and delivery of WSOE under the principle of dual-interest relationship. This chapter is the logical beginning and core of the whole thesis, which also determines the construction of the relevant systems. Chapter?provides a deep analysis of the three main problems among the current legal system of the profit distribution and delivery of WSOE and the state-owned capital's operational budget, namely the profit delivery ratio, the division of functions among MOF and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council(SASAC) and the legal liability. Chapter?and chapter?deal with the solutions to the above three problems from different perspectives. Chapter?designs a flexible legal system for profit delivery ratio which is more adaptable to the market economy than before, including the profits Anticipation Mechanism for defining the“royalty-tax-profit”, and the institution of profit delivery exemption, reduction and postponing. Chapter?divides the function between MOF and SASAC according to the various situations in the stage of profits determined and profits delivered and designs various and proper legal liabilities upon MOF and SASAC.