The Transferring Profit Policy Of Central State-Owned Enterprises And Corporate Governance ——Based On The Views Of Investment Efficiency?Stock Price Crash Risk And Accounting Conservatism

Since the reform of the tax-sharing system,most state-owned enterprises(SOE hereafter)have a non-payment of profits.On one hand,the SOE retain excessive free cash flow,the free cash flow leads to serious agency problems.On the other hand,the government has not received any income from the investment of SOE,leading the government to pay more attention to their social functions,rather than the economic functions.Therefore,the transferring profits policy is not only theoretically reducing the agency problem caused by free cash flow,but also making the government pay more attention to their economic benefits and reducing governmental intervention,thereby improving the efficiency of state-owned enterprises.There are positive effects on the SOE's corporate governance.The transferring policy is starting from 2007 and increased the transferring ratio twice separately in 2011 and 2014.These years can be treated as the policy shocks.This thesis bases on the data of China A-share central governmental controlled listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies from 2003 to 2016 and uses the empirical methodology to examine how the transferring profits policy affect to the corporate governance from three different perspectives,in terms of investment efficiency,stock price crash risk,and accounting conservatism.First of all,this thesis introduces an investment opportunity sensitivity model,by using the strength of DID model.The empirical results show that increasing the transferring proportion of profits from state-owned enterprises to government can significantly enhance the sensitivity of investment opportunities of listed companies controlled by state-owned enterprises.Secondly,this thesis analyzes the impact of the profit transferring policy of central SOEs on the stock price crash risks.The results show that the increasing transferring ratio can significantly reduce the stock price crash risks.Finally,this article further analyzes the transferring profit policy of central SOEs from the perspective of accounting conservatism.The empirical results show that the transferring profit policy of central SOEs can significantly improve the accounting conservatism in central SOEs.The empirical results in this thesis affirm the positive role of the profit transferring from central SOEs to government in improving corporate governance from the three aspects of investment efficiency,stock price crash risks,and accounting conservatism.The conclusion plays an important role in helping the financial reform between the government and state-owned enterprises.