Advance Selling With Consumer Uncertainty Based On Consumer Behavior

Advance Selling is widely used in business with the rapid development of information technology and the popularization of the Internet and mobile Internet.The consumers who arrive in advance period are often faced with the risk of uncertainty of product valuation,product quality and consumption state due to the separation between purchase decisions and actual consumption.And consumer behavior preferences such as the price reference behavior,strategic buying behavior and overconfidence behavior,have a great influence on the motivation to purchase in advance,which also affect the performance of advance selling strategy.Based on the background above,I try to study how sellers formulate the optimal sales strategies to increase demands and profits through advance selling with consumer uncertainty and consumer behaviors.Firstly,this dissertation studies advance selling decisions with an eye to product valuation uncertainty and price reference behavior.I structure two questions for further research on the basis of different consumer composition.The first is to consider the heterogeneity of consumers in price reference behavior,and the second is to consider the heterogeneity of consumers in the uncertainty of product valuation.I discuss the retailer's prices and profits under non-advance selling strategy,discount advance selling strategy and premium advance selling strategy respectively,and how the retailer adopts the optimal sales strategy based on its capacity.I show that the price reference behavior not only affects the retailer's intertemporal price discrimination elasticity,but also affects the feasible areas of the three strategies.Secondly,this dissertation examines advance selling decisions in view of product quality uncertainty and strategic behavior.I establish the signaling game models when product quality information is symmetry and asymmetry separately between strategic consumers and the manufacturer,and get the conditions for separation equilibrium and pooling equilibrium.I demonstrate that the option advance selling itself could be used to signal quality by the high-quality manufacturer when the capacity is large enough.However,whether the manufacture is willing to advance selling and signal quality through the combination of option price and strike price depends on the consumers' prior probability on quality.Finally,this dissertation studies the advance selling decision in consideration of the uncertainty of consumer consumption state and overconfidence behavior.The overconfidence is reflected in the overestimation of the probability when consumers,in a comfortable consumption state,decide to order service products in advance.I study how the service provider decides on whether to advance selling and allow consumers to cancel orders or not based on consumers' such behavior.It is indicated that overconfidence behavior expands the feasible region of the advance selling strategy,and the influence on the necessity of allowing cancellation depends on the service ability.In Summary,this dissertation discusses the influence of price reference behavior on advance selling strategy earlier,provides a new perspective to examine the option advance selling strategy based on the signaling game theory,and constructs the advance selling and cancellation decision-making model under the uncertainty of consumption state and overconfidence behavior.These innovations and conclusions enrich the existing research results and have certain reference value for the realistic decision.