| Since PAIPAIDAI launched P2 P online lending business in China in 2007,online lending has become an important lending channel in China's private finance,providing a new type of financial management for investors.However,for the lenders in the Chinese online lending market,the development of online lending is short,and most online lending lenders are not professionals.In addition,the risk structure of online lending is different from that of stocks and bonds in traditional financial markets.How to review the information quality of the borrowers and online lending platforms to effectively reduce and prevent credit risk sources from borrowers and online lending platforms is an important proposition for many lenders to participate in the online lending market.The behavior characteristics and behavior patterns of market participants,especially individual online lenders,as an important factor affecting the operation and market efficiency of the online lending market,are related to the healthy and sustainable development of the online lending market.Therefore,it is particularly important to systematically examine the lender's behavioral characteristics and behavioral patterns in identifying information nodes of the borrower and online loan platform.This has important academic value and practical guiding significance for improving the financial well-being of lenders,standardizing and promoting the development of the online lending market.In view of this,this article is based on the order of information nodes where the lender participates in the identification of the borrower and the online loan platform.From two theoretical and empirical perspectives,the identities of the lenders in the "identification of creditor's rights" information nodes are investigated."Investment portfolio" behavioral characteristics and theoretical mechanism;"Lender's confidence" behavioral characteristics and theoretical mechanism in the "screening online loan platform" information node.This article mainly draws the following conclusions:(1)First of all,using the micro-credit transaction data of the "Renrendai" platform,it was found that during the "online creditor's rights selection" stage,the "identity preference" behavior of lenders with professional identity tags in the Chinese online lending market.Among them,the identity preference behavior of the lender to the two types of borrowers,private business owners and online merchants,may be derived from the identification of the economic characteristics behind the borrower's professional identity,rather than a pure social identity preference behavior.The consistency analysis of the difference in borrowing success rate due to the difference in borrower's professional identity shows that the identity preference of the private enterprise owner identity borrower belongs to "rational preference",and the identity preference of the online merchant identity borrower belongs to "irrational preference".The existence of this "identity preference" is firstly derived from the decision-making behavior of P2 P lenders who already have knowledge of the economic characteristics of the borrower's professional identity,not a pure social identity preference behavior.Secondly,the "irrational preference" for online merchant identity borrowers is mainly due to the lender's cognitive deviation of online merchant identity borrowers.Further research found that the improvement in the quality of borrower information disclosure can weaken the identity preferences of online loan lenders.(2)Then,using the lender's investment transaction data in the "Renrendai" platform,it was found that in the "online loan debt selection" stage,there is a lender's "debt asset portfolio" behavior characteristic in the Chinese online loan market.This P2 P debt asset portfolio behavior of "putting eggs in multiple baskets" can effectively avoid the risk of online loan lending to a certain extent.This also means that the lender does not have a systematic bias that completely relies on the "borrower's professional identity." Compared with centralized investment,P2 P debt asset portfolio behavior can effectively reduce the degree of lender risk aversion and improve income;however,the scale of P2 P debt asset portfolio and risk aversion has an inverted U-shaped relationship,that is,the size of the debt asset portfolio increases to To a certain extent,it no longer has the role of risk diversification,and it shows a diminishing marginal utility.The research shows that there is a problem with the theoretical optimal or moderate scale of the portfolio of online lending creditor's rights.Although the portfolio strategy can effectively reduce the risk of online lending,the risks and benefits are incompatible,and the lender needs to weigh the risks and benefits.(3)Further,based on the gradual relationship between the lender's "decision of debt target" and "screening of online loan platform",the P2 P platform micro-operation data and Baidu search index data were used to empirically test the lender's The relationship between industry risks and lenders' confidence in the "screening of online loan platform" link.The study found that in the "screening of online lending platforms",the risks of the P2 P online lending industry inhibited the confidence of online lending market participants.And as the risk index of the online lending industry increases,the risk compensation required by online lenders is higher,and the risk perception channel has the effect of strengthening the lender's confidence and risk compensation.Behind this sense of risk perception may contain "emotional overflow." In addition,under the risk impact of the online lending industry,platforms with more standardized risk management such as fund depository,ICP filing,and risk mitigation mechanisms are more likely to be trusted by online loan lenders,and the price of risk compensation requested is also lower.(4)At last,the "identity preference","investment portfolio" and "lender's confidence" behavior characteristics and patterns of online loan lenders at each information node are the evolutionary game results of the online loan market's loan risk and the behavior of participating entities.The borrower,lender and platform in the P2 P online loan transaction are two-tier principal-agent relationships,and there is an agency conflict.The borrower's default risk and the platform's credit risk caused by the borrower and the platform are the direct drivers of the evolution of the lender's investment risk.Among them,in the stage where the lender decides to participate in the loan project of the online loan market,that is,during the game between the lender and the borrower,the risk is mainly caused by the borrower.In this game,in order to effectively avoid the borrower's credit risk,the "identity preference" behavior feature in the selection information node of the creditor's target is that the lender expects to eliminate the borrower's default due to the borrower's "professional identity" signal Risk ".The lender's " debt asset portfolio " behavior is the result of " the lender expects to eliminate the risk of lending due to the default of the borrower by constructing a basket of "subjects".In addition,when the lender participates in the decision-making stage of the P2 P online lending market identification platform,the lender's investment risk may be directly caused by the platform.In this game process,"Lentor's Confidence" is the result of "under the risk conditions of the online lending industry,the lender expects to screen the online lending platform to eliminate the lending risk caused by the default of the P2 P platform".The research in this article provides a new perspective for understanding China's online lending market and lenders' investment behavior,and enriches academic research in this field.This provides some useful references for deepening the understanding of the new financial model of online lending from the perspective of lenders,and understanding the related topics of online lending market risks and lenders' behavioral characteristics.In addition,this article uses theory and empirical to summarize the academic characteristics of the "identity preference","investment portfolio",and "loan confidence" presented by the lender in the Chinese online lending market,and also hopes that its research can Provide appropriate empirical evidence to reasonably guide online lending lenders to optimize asset allocation,realize the preservation and appreciation of wealth,and promote the sustainable development of the online lending industry.The marginal contribution of this article is mainly reflected in the following aspects:First,based on the order of information nodes where the lender participates in the identification of borrowers and online loan platforms,from the theoretical and empirical perspectives,the "identity preference" and "investment portfolio" behaviors in the "identification of credit target" information nodes are investigated.Characteristics and internal mechanism;the behavior model of "Lender Confidence" and its theoretical mechanism in the information node of "Screening Online Loan Platform".Second,the empirical test of the existence and rationality of the "identity preference" behavior of the lender in the "screening of creditor's rights" information nodes.Third,the construction of P2 P debt asset portfolio scale indicators verified that the lender's "debt asset portfolio" behavior in the "screening of creditor's rights" information nodes has a certain effectiveness,and there is no systematic deviation in the "identity preference" screening.Fourth,it quantitatively analyzes the linkage relationship between the "lender's confidence" and the risks of the online lending industry in the information node of the "screening online loan platform".Fifth,based on the basic behavior facts of "identity preference","investment portfolio" and "lender confidence" presented by the lender,the theoretical mechanism of the above-mentioned behavioral characteristics of the lender is systematically analyzed by constructing an evolutionary game model. |
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