The Pricing Mechanism Of Knowledge Payment In The Context Of Internet

Internet knowledge transaction has distinctive characteristics of the times and economy,and consumers have different experience requests and behavior patterns due to individual differences and economic environment,which make the existing knowledge transaction encounter some development difficulties and governance problems.How to combine the characteristics of knowledge transaction with the behavior characteristics of consumers,so as to effectively deal with the governance problems in the process of knowledge transaction,and provide theoretical support for making appropriate marketing strategies for knowledge product sales,is one of the hot spots of current academic research.Considering that the pricing of products is the most basic and critical mean of governance,also the most flexible and artistic strategy in the marketing strategies of enterprises,how to formulate the pricing strategy of Internet knowledge products will have considerable theoretical and practical significance.This paper starts with the assumption of complete intellectual property protection,and considers the pricing mechanism of knowledge providers when there is no piracy(the most stringent or complete intellectual property protection).Under the assumption of complete intellectual property protect ion,based on the theory of market structure,Internet knowledge transaction can be divided into "knowledge subscription mode of unilateral monopoly(one provider corresponds to multiple consumers)","knowledge consultation mode of bilateral monopoly(one provider corresponds to one consumer)" and " knowledge competition mode of market competition(multiple providers correspond to multiple consumers)".Based on the characteristics of Internet knowledge transaction,this paper discusses the optimal pricing strategies of providers under different modes.Secondly,under the assumption of incomplete intellectual property protection,the decision-making of intellectual property protection of the provider is internalized,and the optimal decision-making and pricing strategy of intellectual property protection of the provider are considered when there exists piracy(unauthorized sharing).This paper mainly discusses the pricing mechanism of Internet knowledge transaction from the following four parts:In the knowledge subscription mode,the pricing strategy of knowledge transaction in the community learning environment is analyzed.In the Internet knowledge transaction,the value of knowledge products is concealed to both the supply and demand sides.As an important source of product experience information,the online community plays a key role in the process of appearing knowledge value.Based on this,this paper firstly incorporates the social interaction factor into the knowledge payment two-phase pricing game model,and deeply explores the impact of the community learning mechanism on the optimal pricing strategy.The model analysis finds that: Firstly,knowledge providers should “across the river by feeling for the stone” for dynamic pricing.They should provide “community prices” to the early consumer groups,and then formulate the late “market prices” based on community information feedback.Secondly,there is an upper threshold for optimal community price to ensure a good community learning atmosphere;the optima l market price depends on knowledge costs,consumer participation utility and posterior beliefs,which present a “non-linear” relationship with the true value of the product.Thirdly,knowledge products should generally adopt penetrating pricing methods,a nd consumer patience,community activity and community interaction efficiency have important impacts on equilibrium price.Further welfare analysis shows that the Internet community learning context will increase the benefits of knowledge providers.This paper reveals the deep logic of knowledge transaction pricing in the Internet environment: the “strategic effect” and “information effect” caused by community learning reshape the behavioral model of knowledge consumers,and then force the knowledge providers to adopt adaptive dynamic pricing mechanism.In the knowledge consultation mode,the pricing strategy of knowledge transaction in the context of personalized customization is analyzed.Different from the knowledge transmission in traditional homogeneous indoctrination education,paid knowledge service under the Internet environment emphasizes more about active learning and deep interaction,which presents the contextualization and customization features.Based on the customization of knowledge product and the perceived value of consumers,this paper proposes a logic of selection of knowledge transaction pricing strategy.To in depth discuss the influencing factors and adoption timing of the two pricing strategies at different levels of customization,the m athematical models of“fixed pricing” and “negotiated pricing” are separately constructed.The comparing study shows that: Firstly,under the fixed pricing strategy,the provider's yield depends on the level of knowledge customization and the marginal cost of knowledge production.Secondly,under the negotiated pricing strategy,the provider's yield depends on the marginal cost of knowledge production,negotiation cost and consumer's bargaining power.Thirdly,when the level of knowledge customization is relatively low,a fixed pricing strategy should be adopted,otherwise adopt a negotiated pricing strategy.This study reveals the deep influence mechanism of the knowledge customization on the pricing strategy: the improvement of the knowledge customization standards will enhance the perceived value of the consumers,with the catalysis of differential pricing,the negotiated pricing has advantages over the other.In the knowledge competition mode,this paper analyzes the pricing strategy of knowledge transaction under the situation of market competition.Considering that consumers have different types and distinguished search costs,the mathematical models of “fixed pricing” and “negotiated pricing” of knowledge products are constructed respectively in the Int ernet knowledge transaction.The optimal pricing strategy selection and the optimal knowledge price formulation of providers under the duopoly competition mode are investigated.The model analysis shows that: Firstly,the optimal fixed price,the optimal negotiation price and the optimal reservation price are affected by the proportion of ordinary consumers,the search cost of consumers,the negotiating power of consumers and some other factors.Secondly,when the proportion of ordinary consumers is relativ ely high or the negotiating power of consumers is relatively low,the negotiated pricing strategy adopted by all knowledge providers is better than the fixed pricing strategy.Thirdly,under some conditions,the better negotiated pricing strategy equilibri um will be impacted by the fixed pricing strategy,and the better fixed pricing strategy equilibrium will also be impacted by the negotiated pricing strategy,and the asymmetric pricing strategy adopted by the provider may also be the equilibrium solution.In the mode of property right protection,the decision-making of intellectual property protection and the pricing strategy of knowledge products are analyzed.In the Internet knowledge transaction,unauthorized sharing seriously affects the purchase intention of consumers and the original motivation of providers,but whether the moststrictest decision of property right protection should be taken has not been determined.This paper constructs a three-stage game pricing model of knowledge transaction to investigate the optimal decision-making of property rights protection and the optimal pricing strategy of knowledge provider.The results show that: Firstly,the optimal decision of intellectual property protection depends on the proportion of moral consumers and the social tolerance for piracy,along with a non-linear relationship between the decision and the proportion of moral consumers.Secondly,the number of moral consumers searching for information of intellectual products decreases with the proportion of moral consumers and the strength of property protection,and increases with the tolerance of social piracy.Thirdly,the knowledge price increases with the proportion of moral consumers and the intensity of property rights protection,and decreases with the increase of social piracy tolerance,which reveals that intellectual property protection decisions affect the intellectual pricing strategies of suppliers by influencing the appeal of pirated knowledge to ordinary consumers.This paper comes to a count erintuitive but enlightening conclusion:considering the “behavior effect” and “information effect” brought by intellectual property protection,maintain the flexibility of property rights protection decision adopted by knowledge provider maybe more ration al,rather than the strict one...