Customer Information And Collateral Loan Contract

Bank loan is one of the important channels for the company to raise operating funds.Existing research generally studies the determinants of borrowing costs from aspects of the company's operating status,financial status,company size,and macroeconomic development status,but rarely analyzes customer concentration on the company Impact of borrowing costs.With the popularization of supply chain finance in the practical world and the company's strategic increase in customer concentration,scholars at home and ab ROAd have begun to examine the positive or negative impact of customer concentration on corporate bank borrowings.Customer concentration can affect the company's operating risk,financial status and quality of accounting information,and thus have a significant impact on debt contracts.And when the bank issues a loan to the borrower,whether the credit method or the non-credit method is different,the cost is different for the enterprise.When a bank evaluates the information quality of an enterprise to be insufficient to support a credit loan,it indicates that the bank needs to take other measures to mitigate credit risk.At the same time,some studies have found that in the credit market,the use of collateral is not to alleviate the information asymmetry before the loan,but to solve the moral hazard caused by the information asymmetry after the loan issuance.In order to prevent credit risks,banks require mortgages from borrowers.Therefore,mortgage loans are a better scenario to study the impact of customer information on enterprises.Specifically,this article intends to study how banks view corporate customer information disclosure through the specific characteristics of corporate mortgage loans.At present,the research on the influencing factors of the debt contract has shifted from the internal characteristics of the company to the external environment,but the external factors are mainly focused on macroeconomics,laws,industry competition,regional factors,etc.For the most non-financial stakeholders in the product market,the attention of major customers is not enough.Major customers,as an important part of the business strategy in the enterprise product market,will definitely affect the company's operating activities,and then affect the company's financial decisions.Stakeholder theory and customer literature show that large customers have two opposite effects of risk and return: On the one hand,when the overall effect is reflected as a risk effect,the company's operating risk will rise,increasing the company's financial distress Probability,the risk expectations of external investors and management also increase.Due to information asymmetry,when creditors believe that large customers are at risk,in order to prevent moral hazard after the signing of the debt contract,stricter contract terms will be formulated,such as raising interest rates,requiring collateral,reducing loan quotas,shortening debt terms,etc..On the other hand,the overall effect of customer concentration may also be reflected as a revenue effect.Mainly because good customer relationships can not only achieve information sharing in the supply chain,improve products in a timely manner,and improve the market competitiveness of products,but also help formulate accurate production plans,reduce inventory backlog and impairment losses,and increase inventory turnover.,To improve operating performance,reduce the company's operating risk,increase profitability,stabilize sales income and cash flow,and the requirements of mortgage loans come from the risk assessment of the company,will inevitably be affected by the company's operating conditions,and other conditions unchanged Banks may require companies to use mortgages more to obtain loans.So whether customer concentration affects collateral loan and which effect is more significant is an open question.I use the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as a sample in the thesis to explore the impact of customer information disclosure as an important external non-financial stakeholder on corporate mortgage loans.This article mainly examines three issues: First,whether the disclosure of customer information will affect the bank's risk assessment of the enterprise,which reflects the change in the proportion of mortgage loans.The important issue that needs to be discussed is which of the risk effect and governance effect of large customers Dominance;Second,obtain customer concentration from disclosed customer information,and how customer concentration affects collateral loans,and what are the possible influencing factors;third,if customer concentration is a factor that increases corporate risk from a bank perspective That is,from the perspective of the creditor,you realize the risk effect of customer concentration,then what path does customer concentration affect the collateral loan,inventory turnover,or trade credit?In order to solve the above problems,the empirical content mainly includes the following three parts:In Chapter 3,it examines whether the degree of customer information disclosure affects the company's dependence on mortgage loans.Research on the adjustment mechanism of customer concentration affecting mortgage loans shows that when companies disclose customer details,banks may obtain private information due to supply chain spillover effects,alleviate information asymmetry,and then reduce the guarantee conditions for corporate loans.In Chapter 4,it examines whether the concentration of customers affects the amount and proportion of corporate mortgage loans.This chapter uses 2007-2017 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as a sample.The total sales ratio of the previous five customers,the sales ratio of the largest customer and the Herfindahl index of the top five customers are used as explanatory variables to study whether customer concentration is correct.The amount and proportion of corporate mortgage loans have an impact.The research found that the concentration of customers significantly increased the amount and proportion of corporate mortgage loans.The measurement of customer concentration was the top five largest customers' sales proportion and the regression analysis of the sum of the squared sums of the top five largest customers' sales.The regression results support the conclusion that the company has a high When customers are concentrated,their profits are eroded because of their strong bargaining power.In addition,the loss of customers to the company caused potential operating risks and even bankruptcy risks,which increased the company's debt default risk and the risk of debt repayment after default.In order to prevent the loss of their own interests,banks will increase their mortgage requirements on enterprises.In Chapter 5,it discusses the path that customer concentration affects corporate mortgage loans.On the basis of the foregoing,further study the role of customer information disclosure,especially the degree of customer concentration affecting the collateral loan mechanism,what factors affect the degree of positive relationship between the two.The study found that when the quality of the customer relationship is high,the risk effect brought by the concentration of customers can be mitigated,and when the customer relationship is poor,the risk effect is more significant.High customer concentration increases the business risk of the enterprise,which in turn results in banks being more likely to require collateral when issuing loans.Operating risk has an intermediary effect in the positive correlation between customer concentration and collateral loan.Studying the relationship between customer concentration and bank borrowing is in line with China's current financial development and company development needs,and has strong practical significance in the current economic environment.To provide a reference for the company to rationally adjust the customer structure and optimize the use of customer advantages.This article creatively analyzes the impact of customer concentration on corporate mortgage loans from different perspectives,enriches existing literature,and provides a reference for company development.At the same time,it has important practical significance for China to deepen the reform of state-owned banks and improve financial services in the supply chain.The possible research contributions of this paper are mainly reflected in the following aspects:First,the existing literature on the factors affecting bank borrowing mainly examines the characteristics of enterprises,information quality,default risk,financial development,creditor protection mechanisms,etc.The research on supply chain relationships is relatively inadequate,and China's bank borrowing research rarely targets Collateral loan.This paper expands the research on the influencing factors of China's bank debt contracts,especially mortgage loans,and enriches the relevant literature.Second,most of the existing customer literature focuses on companies in developed markets as research objects.This article overcomes the problem of sample selection bias that may exist in foreign studies to a certain extent,and has certain implications for emerging markets such as China or developing countries.The enlightenment provides a perspective of supply chain finance for the study of the financing behavior of Chinese enterprises.This article takes China's data as a sample,not only explores whether customer concentration will affect the company's debt contract,but also analyzes its transmission mechanism and supplements relevant literature.Third,explore whether customer concentration has affected mortgage loans through increased operating risks,explored the transmission mechanism of customer information disclosure and the quality of customer relationships on debt contracts,and enriched the relevant literature on customer concentration and capital markets.