Supply Chain Financing Mode Selection And Incentive Mechanism Design Under Asymmetric Credit Default Risk Information

Capital-constrain hampers enterprise's operations decision,in turn,affects the development coordination of the entire supply chain.Supply chain finance provides a new way for the capital-constrained enterprise to obtain credit financing.However,the credit default risk and information asymmetry restrict the further prosperity of supply chain finance.Thus,it is theoretically and practically significant to study effective financing modes and incentive mechanisms under asymmetric credit default risk.From the perspectives of credit default risk,default risk transmission,stochastic market demand,and dual asymmetric information,this dissertation investigates how the core enterprise selects credit financing mode and designs the incentive mechanism.The specific contents are as follows:First,this dissertation explores the problem of credit default risk under asymmetric information.Consider a direct selling supply chain composed of a supplier and a market customer.Credit financing generates default risk and capital time cost while stimulating sales.And the customer has credit information privately.The screening mode,the censoring mode,and the insurance mode are proposed to analyze the supplier's financing characteristics and credit financing equilibrium.The main results show that information asymmetry leads to adverse selection,like the credit period and consumption of the high credit type customer are always restricted.If the market credit condition is relatively poor,the supplier is more inclined to only adopt the screening mode;otherwise,based on the balance between the credit incentive effect and the credit default risk gap effect,the supplier has more space to select all three modes.Next,this dissertation studies the problem of asymmetric credit default risk under risk transmission in a supply chain.Consider a supply chain composed of supplierretailer-customer based on two-level trade credit.The upstream trade credit is provided by the supplier and the downstream trade credit is provided by the retailer.And the retailer has credit information privately.The credit financing contracts under the screening mode,the censoring mode and the insurance mode and the supplier's choice among them are explored.It is found that due to the linkage effect of upstream and downstream trade credit,the low-credit retailer can grant the longer credit period obtained from the supplier to the customer to increase sales,thus intensifying adverse selection.It is only when the credit status of the retailer is relatively poor that the supplier tends to adopt the insurance mode;otherwise,the screening or censoring mode will be selected based on the default rate relationship of the high/low credit retailer.Additionally,this dissertation exploits the problem of asymmetric credit default risk under stochastic market demand.Consider a logistics retail supply chain composed of a supplier and a logistic service provider.And the logistic service provider has asymmetric credit information and faces stochastic market demand and logistic cost.Whether the supplier would provide credit financing to stimulate sales and the corresponding credit financing equilibrium are explored.The impact of market fluctuation and logistic cost on the equilibrium are also analyzed.The results indicate that when the market credit status is poor or the sales incentive effect is small,the supplier prefers the screening mode.Besides,although a low market expectation or a small market fluctuation prompts the supplier to adopt the screening mode,when either of these two factors increases,asymmetric default risk and market factors will affect the supplier's choice of credit financing mode jointly.Finally,this dissertation investigates the financing difficulty problem of SMEs(small and medium-sized enterprises)under dual asymmetric information.Consider a supply chain composed of a supplier,a bank and an SME.The SME has private credit information and unobservable operation efforts.The individual credit financing mode,the coalition credit financing mode and the government subsidy are explored.The financing strategies of different participants in the supply chain are analyzed and compared.And the causes and solutions of SMEs' financing difficulty are explored.It is shown that under the influence of the dual asymmetric information,the supplier prefers to adopt the individual credit financing mode,while the bank prefers to adopt the coalition credit financing mode.That is,it is difficult for the bank to provide credit financing unless the supplier is involved,so the internal conflict between creditors makes it difficult for SMEs to obtain financing.At this point,comparing to subsidizing the bank,the government can almost efficiently alleviate the problem in SMEs' financing by offering a relatively lower subsidy rate to the supplier.