| Small and Micro Enterprises(Abbreviate SMEs)are one of the key services of inclusive finance.Since the introduction of the development of inclusive finance in2013,China has continuously emphasized the need to strengthen financial services for such long-tailed groups as SMEs,which provides a good development environment for SMEs.China has successively introduced various policies to encourage financial institutions to support the development of SMEs.With the support of policies related to inclusive finance,financial institutions have continuously increased the investment in SMEs,and the scale of SMEs has shown an upward trend.The balance of SME loans have increased from 7.55 trillion yuan at the end of 2010 to 33.49 trillion yuan at the end of 2018,which is 4.4 times the balance of SME loans at the end of 2010.According to the data of China Financial Yearbook 2017,as the scale of enterprises(large,medium,small and micro-small)declines,the proportion of mortgage loans has gradually increased,and the proportion of credit loans has gradually decreased.This fully shows that financial institutions believe that the smaller the size of the enterprise,the higher the degree of information asymmetry,the more incline to issue collateral loan.About 50% of SMEs need to provide collateral to get loans.Although the financial service level of SMEs is gradually rising,the difficulty of financing SME loans is still serious.SMEs are small in scale,flexible in operation,and uncertain in production.They are at the end of the entire industrial chain,and their ability to resist risk is weak.Especially under the overlapping effects of economic downturn,Sino-US trade friction escalation,decommissioning,financial deleveraging,and liquidity stratification,non-performing loans of SMEs are increasingly prominent.The non-performing loan ratio of SME loans below 1 million yuan is higher.non-performing loans of SMEs have become the focus of banking financial institutions.How to reduce the default risk of SME loans is a major issue related to the development prospect of structural reform of China's financial supply side.Therefore,it is of far-reaching practical significance to study the default risk of SMEs.With the decline of the scale of enterprises,the proportion of mortgage loans has gradually increased,the default risk has gradually increased,and the quality of assets has gradually deteriorated.Large-scale corporate loans based on credit guarantees have lower default risk and better asset quality.SME loans mainly based on mortgage guarantees have higher default risk and poorer asset quality.Compared with large and medium-sized enterprises,SMEs are high-risk enterprises,and the problem of information asymmetry is more serious in SME loans.An important reason for the formation of SME loans default risk is information asymmetry.There is a large amount of information asymmetry in the SMEs credit market,which is reflected in the adverse selection beforehand and the moral hazard after the event.In order to mitigate the adverse selection and moral hazard caused by information asymmetry,the guarantees with the main form of mortgage and guarantee are widely existed in the loan contract.Among the loans issued by Chinese financial institutions for SMEs,most of the loans require collateral and SMEs that cannot provide collateral need to provide guarantee.What is the role of mortgage and guarantee in alleviating information asymmetry?Whether to ease the reversal of SMEs in the pre-lending screening ? In the post-lending supervision,has it alleviated the moral hazard of SMEs? Mortgage and guarantee of these two guarantees methods,which can reduce the default risk of SME loans?This paper follows the two main lines of mortgage and guarantee,based on the micro-data of SMEs,from the two perspectives of pre-lending and post-lending supervision,empirically analyzes the impact of mortgage and guarantee on the ex ante risk and the ex post default risk of SME loans.This paper judges the role of mortgage and guarantee in adverse selection and moral hazard.It compares the differences between mortgage and guarantee on the default risk of SME loans,and finds which guarantee method is more effective in alleviated information asymmetry.This paper combines interest rate pricing,from the perspective of different value collateral and different guarantee methods,analyzes the reasons for the high default risk of SMEs.This has important practical significance for financial institutions to prevent and resolve the default risk of SMEs and improve their risk management capabilities to better promote the financial services entity economy.From the perspective of information asymmetry,mortgage reduces the ex ante risk of SME loans.mortgage plays a role in screening the quality of SMEs before the issuance of SME loans,and the screening effect is better,which mitigated the adverse selection.mortgage effectively reduces the default risk of SME loans and alleviates the moral hazard.Not only that,after the loan issuance,mortgage plays a certain role in preventing the loan from SMEs from suspicious to loss-type assets.Although guarantee cannot mitigates the adverse selection before the loan,it can effectively alleviates the moral hazard after the loan is issued.The credit enhancement function of the guarantor is not effective in screening the quality of the SMEs,and it has not effectively mitigated the adverse selection beforehand.Guarantee effectively reduces the default risk of SME loans afterwards and mitigates moral hazard.Guarantee not only reduces the default risk of SME loans,but also effectively prevents SME loans from sub-evolving to suspicious,loss and other forms.Compared with mortgage loans,guarantee loans have higher ex ante risk and adverse selection is more serious.The reason is that in the case that banks cannot identify the risk of SMEs,mortgage can helps the bank separate good borrowers from bad borrowers because of the higher cost of bad borrowers providing mortgage.Because the guarantor's entry threshold is low,the SMEs provide the guarantor's low cost,the guarantor's strength is uneven,the guarantee ability is limited,banks can not fully identify the guarantor's risk,etc.,resulting in the guarantee that the good borrower and the bad borrower cannot be effectively separated,so it is guarantee that the ex ante risk of SME loans cannot be reduced,and the adverse selection is mitigated.With regard to ex post default risks,compared with the mortgage,guarantee can reduces the default risk of SME loans and mitigate moral hazard.The reason is that interest rate has greatly affected the default risk of SME loans afterwards.Whether it is mortgage or guarantee loans,the higher the interest rate,the higher the ex post default risk.The average execution rate of mortgage loans issued by bank for SMEs is greater than guarantee loans,which leads to the ex post default risk of mortgage loans being higher than guarantee loans.From the point of view of compensation,mortgage loans are the guarantee of the goods,mortgage is the internal guarantee,Banks are compensated within the scope of the collateral value,mortgage loans are vulnerable to the macroeconomics,the collateral value fluctuation and the implementation is more difficult.The influence of factors has enhanced the difficulty of compensating the execution of collateral and increased the default risk of SME loans.The guarantee is a person's guarantee,and the guarantor's guarantee belongs to the external guarantee.In the guarantee loans,the guarantor bears the unlimited joint liability with all its assets,which greatly reduces the ex post default risk of SME loans.Credit product design is unscientific and the default risk is high.Since mortgage and guarantee can reduce the ex post default risk of SME loans and mitigate moral hazard,why have the default risk of SME loans gradually exposed in recent years,and the balance of non-performing loans and non-performing loan rates have risen? This is closely related to interest rate pricing,different value collateral and different guarantee methods of default risk of SME loans.The study finds that compared with strong mortgage,weak mortgage not only increases the ex ante risk of SMEs,increases the adverse selection,but also increases the ex post default risk of SMEs after the event,which aggravates the moral hazard of SMEs.Weak mortgage not only increases the default risk of SME loans,but also accelerates the deterioration of loans from the normal state to the secondary-and loss state.As a result,weak mortgage has raised the default risk of mortgage.compares with the natural person's single guarantee,the natural person joint guarantee can not only reduces the ex ante risk of SMEs,mitigates the adverse selection,but also greatly reduces ex post default risk or SME loans and mitigates moral hazard.Unreasonable pricing of credit product rates will result in defaults on SME loans.the higher the interest rate,the higher the default risk of SME loans.Banks effectively separates low-risk and high-risk SMEs by designing different loan contracts.Bank match(strong mortgage,low interest rate)borrowing contract for SMEs that provide strong mortgage,and matches(weak mortgage,high interest rate)borrowing contracts for SMEs that provide weak mortgage.SME loans with different value collateral have different risk attributes,and the default risk of weak mortgages is higher than that of strong mortgages.Banks prefer to issue low-interest strong mortgages for low-risk SMEs,but often because there are fewer SMEs that can provide strong mortgage,forcing banks to carry out high-interest weak mortgages.The higher price of weak mortgage interest rates has prompted SMEs to increase their morality by pursuing higher investment,conducting foreign investment outside the main business,and pursuing investment projects such as coal mines and real estate with low investment success rate and high yield.This is one of the main reasons for the increase in the balance of non-performing loans and the increase in non-performing rates.SME loans with different guarantee methods have different risk attributes,and the natural person's single guarantee default risk is higher than the natural person joint guarantee.The natural person single guarantees that the product itself is at higher risk,and it is the highland where the risk of SMEs is concentrated,in order to reduce the risk premium,banks have designed higher loans interest rate.The bank's single guarantee loans for natural persons with high interest rates are another major reasons for the increase in the balance of non-performing loans and the increase in non-performing rates.The bank's risk screening capabilities have yet to be further improved.In the two aspects of pre-lending screening and post-lending supervision,there are certain gaps in the basic characteristics of SME owners,regional characteristics,borrower contract characteristics,macroeconomic variables on ex ante risk and ex post default risk.Regarding the influence of the basic characteristics of SME owners,this paper finds that in the pre-lending screening process,the older and higher education level,the risk of the female micro-enterprises of the operating company is higher ex ante risk;in the post-lending supervision,more educated male individual industrial and commercial households have higher ex post default risk.Regarding the impact of regional characteristics,in the pre-lending screening process,SME loans in eastern Inner Mongolia have lower ex ante risk,and SME loans in the central and western regions have higher ex ante risk;in post-lending supervision,The ex post default risk of SME loans in the eastern and central Inner Mongolia region is higher than that in the western region.Regarding the impact of the characteristics of the loan contract,the impact of the loan amount on the ex ante risk of SME loans is not significant in the pre-lending screening process;in the post-lending supervision,the SME loan with higher loan amount has higher ex post default risk.The loan term has a consistent result in the pre-lending screening and post-lending supervision,that is,the longer the term,the lower the risk of SME loans ex ante risk and ex post default risk.The repayment method of the monthly equal amount of principal and interest taken by the bank to prevent ex ante risk has not effectively reduced the ex post default risk of SMEs.Regarding the impact of macroeconomic variables,the faster the GDP growth rate in Inner Mongolia,the lower the ex ante risk of SME loans in the pre-lending screening.In the post-lending supervision,the faster GDP growth in Inner Mongolia,The higher ex post default risk of SME loans.The M2 growth rate has achieved consistent results in the pre-lending screening and post-lending supervision,that is,the faster the M2 growth rate,the higher ex ante risk and ex post default risk of SME loans.This fully shows that bank risks have a strong procyclicality.When the economy is developing at a fast pace,banks tend to underestimate risks.They believe that SMEs have low ex ante risk.Once the economy slows down,the default risk of SMEs will gradually be exposed,and the ex post default risk will be higher.Different guarantee methods have heterogeneous effects on default risk of SME loans in different regions.Banks believe that whether it is the middle and eastern regions with high economic development level in Inner Mongolia or the western regions with low economic development level,mortgage can reduces the pre-lending risk of SME loans and mitigates adverse selection.guarantee increases the pre-lending risk of SME loans in different regions and aggravates adverse selection.The default risk of SME loans is not only related to the mortgage guarantee method,but also closely related to the characteristic economic situation of SMEs.The higher the level of economic development in Inner Mongolia,the higher the default risk of guarantee loans,and the lower the default risk of mortgage loans.Mortgage loans for SMEs in central and eastern Inner Mongolia have lower default risk,and the default risk in the western region is higher.Guarantee loans are just the opposite.The innovations of this article are mainly reflected in the following aspects:First,empirical research on the perspective innovation of natural person credit guarantee.The existing literature mostly studies the role of third-party commercial guarantee institutions in relieving information asymmetry from a theoretical perspective.Some literatures have concluded that it can reduce the default risk of loans and mitigate moral hazard.Some literatures believe that the default risk of loans is increased and moral hazard is exacerbated.A few literatures analyze the default risk of natural person credit guarantee loans from a theoretical perspective,however,empirical research is lacking.In this paper,the research focuses on the natural person credit guarantee explored by less scholars,and analyzes the impact of guarantee on the default risk of SME loans from the perspective of empirical analysis.This paper provides a strong support for cracking the loan problem of SMEs due to lack of effective collateral,improving the bank's issuance of natural person credit guarantee,and controlling the risk of natural person credit guarantee default of SMEs.Second,unlike previous studies that only focus on the default risk of SMEs,this paper analyzes the role of mortgage in adverse selection and moral hazard from two perspectives: pre-lending and post-lending supervision.The existing theory emphasizes that the guarantee method represented by mortgage can reduce moral hazard and adverse selection and alleviate information asymmetry;while empirical research is mainly aimed at seeking evidence of moral hazard or adverse selection in the credit market.From an empirical point of view,whether the mortgage is to mitigate the adverse selection before or after the moral hazard,the existing literature has not yet reached a consensus conclusion.What role does mortgage play in adverse selection and moral hazard? The existing empirical literature has not yet been clarified.Based on the theory of information asymmetry,this paper uses the empirical method to explore the impact of mortgage on the ex ante risk and the ex post default risk of SMEs from the two dimensions of pre-lending and post-lending supervision.This paper examines the existing theory from an empirical perspective and effectively separates the role of mortgage in mitigating information asymmetry.This not only clarifies the role of mortgage in alleviating information asymmetry,but more importantly,it examines the scientific nature of the bank's traditional“collateral worship”risk prevention and control measures.It provides a new design concept for financial institutions to design and improve mortgage products.Third,the multi-dimensional test of bank risk screening ability and risk management ability is innovative.The comparative analysis of this paper finds that there is a certain gap between the pre-lending screening and the post-lending supervision effect of bank.The five major aspects of the basic characteristics,industry characteristics,regional characteristics,loan contract characteristics and macroeconomic variables of SMEs have different effects on the ex ante risk and ex post default risk of SMEs.This fully demonstrates that the bank's risk screening capability needs to be further improved,and only after the actual risk-recognition criteria has been able to help the bank identify the ex ante risk of SMEs,thereby reducing the default risk of SMEs. |
PDF Full Text Request