| As a long-term mechanism,management equity incentive plays an important role in corporate governance.The management and the interests of the enterprise are closely combined through the equity bond,which plays a promoting role in improving the corporate governance structure,reducing the principal-agent problem caused by the separation of ownership and management in modern enterprises,and improving the management efficiency,thus helping enterprise to achieve its strategic goals.However,if the equity incentive mechanism is improperly used,the excessive incentive phenomenon of "Super Option" will lead to the rent-seeking motive and behavior of the management,thus damaging the interests of shareholders and the value of the enterprise.It can be seen that management equity incentive is a "Double-edged Sword",so how to make good use of this "Double-edged Sword" and grasp the scale of equity incentive intensity,so as to make the long-term mechanism of equity incentive play a positive role in corporate governance has become an important issue faced by the theoretical and practical fields.In addition,based on the usefulness view of accounting decisions,existing studies show that the comparability of accounting information can help enterprises compare,identify and evaluate investment projects,improve decision-making efficiency.Moreover,it can play a positive role in promoting information transmission and effective decision-making of external investors and financial institutions.Then,management equity incentive is bound to affect the comparability of accounting information.On the other hand,Debt maturity is an important part of the debt contract,and the business operating and financial conditions of enterprises conveyed by accounting information are important factors affecting contract decision,High-quality accounting information can reduce the degree of information asymmetry between enterprises and the outside environment,help creditors to reasonably evaluate the value of investment projects,strengthen the supervision of the process of capital use,and ensure the safety of creditor's rights.According to the definition of IFRS and ISO,the quality of accounting information should be the sum of the characteristics of the ability of accounting information to meet explicit and implicit needs.Quality characteristics include relevance,reliability,comparability,substance over form,etc.comparability,As one of the important characteristics of accounting information quality,FASB explains its connotation as "an information quality feature that helps information users identify the similarities and differences of the same or similar economic phenomena in different industries and enterprises",and FASB points out that if the comparability of accounting information is not available,investors cannot make investment decisions accurately and effectively.The comparability of accounting information will help financial institutions to have a deeper understanding of the economic business essence behind accounting figures,identify the similarities and differences between economic phenomena,analyze the causes and trends of accounting performance changes,reduce information acquisition and processing costs,and effectively judge the value correlation between reference companies and target companies.The 2020 Government Work Report of the 13th National People's Congress once again stressed that under the premise of the normalization of epidemic prevention and control,we should adhere to the general tone of seek improvement in stability work,adhere to the new development concept,adhere to the main line of supply-side structural reform,and adhere to the drive of reform and opening up to promote high-quality development.On the issue of supply-side structural reform,in July 2019,the Political Bureau meeting proposed to "promote financial supply-side structural reform and continue to guide financial institutions to increase medium-and long-term financing support for manufacturing industry and private enterprises".This raises the issue of debt maturity structure to the level of national financial governance and becomes an important issue in deepening the financial supply-side structural reform.As an important part of corporate debt financing decisions,debt maturity structure not only affects corporate financing costs and investment behaviors,but also affects financial risks,corporate value and even macroeconomic stability.The shorter the debt maturity,the higher the frequency and the greater the pressure of the enterprise to pay the principal and interest,the worse the ability to deal with economic fluctuations or emergencies,However,in the economic downturn,financial institutions will compress the credit funds,and the enterprise will face severe challenges.The unbalanced debt maturity structure of the capital market will not only hinder the production and operation activities and sustainable development of enterprises,but also increase the probability of enterprise default and endanger the national credit system,financial order and economic stability.In view of this,this paper will try to solve the following problems in the context of the above:First,Investigate the impact of accounting information comparability on the maturity structure of corporate debt,and provides theoretical explanation and empirical evidence for the impact path and mechanism.In addition,considering that enterprises of different ownership nature are prevalent in the capital market and that China's government-dominated financial system will lead financial institutions,mainly state-owned banks,to favor state-owned enterprises in their financing policies,Therefore,will further analyze whether the impact of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure will be different due to the different nature of enterprise ownership.Secondly,based on the optimal contract theory and the management power theory,explore that how the management equity incentive,as a long-term governance mechanism,will affect the comparability of accounting information,Based on the enterprise mechanism of"Corporate Governance? Business Behavior?Financial Consequences"(Li Wei'an,2011),As a corporate governance mechanism,management equity incentive does not directly affect the comparability of accounting information,but indirectly affects the comparability of accounting information through business behavior.Therefore,the micro path and mechanism of the effect of management equity incentive on the comparability of accounting information will be studied from the perspective of business behavior.Thirdly,study whether the management equity incentive has a moderating effect on the impact of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure.If so,what kind of adjustment will be played and whether there is a problem of "Entrenchment Effect".Focusing on the above questions,this paper arranges the following research chapters:The first chapter is the introduction,which elaborates the research background and significance,the research objectives and ideas,the research contents and methods,and the main innovation points of the paper.The second chapter is a literature review,which sorts out the research literature in the field of economic consequences of management equity incentive,influencing factors and economic consequences of accounting information comparability,and influencing factors of debt maturity structure,and summarizes and sorts out the shortcomings of the existing research and clarify the research direction and research contribution of this paper.The third chapter elaborates the basic contents of optimal contract theory,management power theory,information asymmetry theory and principal-agent theory.In addition,the basic concepts of this paper will be defined and the basic theoretical framework will be constructed around the research theme of this paper.The fourth,fifth and sixth chapters are the empirical research part.The fourth chapter firstly studies the effect of management equity incentive on the comparability of accounting information based on optimal contract theory and management power theory,explores whether the management equity incentive is reflected by the optimal contract to strengthen governance or the "Free Arbitrage" of the management power,and the reasons for the existence of this influence effect.Secondly,study whether the corporate strategy radicalism is influenced by the change of management decision caused by equity incentive,whether it acts as an intermediary channel and has an effect on the comparability of accounting information,and what is its specific effect.Finally,the moderating effect of management equity incentive on the comparability of accounting information is further explored from three aspects:industry characteristics,external audit and the nature of enterprise ownership.The fifth chapter analyzes and tests the effect of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure based on information asymmetry theory and principal-agent theory,explores the path and mechanism of this effect.Based on the theory of property rights,and whether the effect of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure will be different due to the different nature of enterprise ownership.The sixth chapter mainly investigates whether management equity incentive has a moderating effect on the impact of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure and whether there is a problem with the "Entrenchment Effect".The main conclusions of this study are as follows:Conclusion one:The effect of management equity incentive on the comparability of accounting information is an inverted U shape,the aggressive degree of enterprise strategy plays a mediating role in this effect.Firstly,taking A-share listed companies in China's capital market from 2008 to 2018 as research samples,based on the optimal contract theory and management power theory,the research finds that when the management shareholding ratio is less than 35%,equity incentive is reflected as "Benefit Synergy"effect,which will improve the comparability of accounting information of enterprises.When the shareholding ratio is higher than 35%,equity incentive is reflected as "Benefit Embezzlement" effect,which will reduce the comparability of accounting information of enterprises.Secondly,management equity incentive has an effect on accounting information comparability through the channel of aggressive degree of enterprise strategy,and this channel shows a negative mediating effect.That is to say,management equity incentive can improve aggressive degree of enterprise strategy by increasing investment level and innovation input,but when aggressive degree of enterprise strategy reaches a certain degree,the operating risk and financial distress caused by it will reduce the comparability of accounting information.Finally,compared with the high-tech industry and SOEs,the impact of management equity incentive on reducing accounting information comparability through improving aggressive degree of enterprise strategy is stronger in the non-high-tech industry and non-SOEs.High audit quality can identify the earnings management behavior of enterprises through equity incentive motivation,and play the function of supervision and governance to weaken the impact of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure.Conclusion two:The comparability of accounting information has a positive impact on the maturity structure of corporate debt,earnings management and agency cost play a mediating role in this effect.Debt maturity structure is an integral part of debt contract pricing,which is the result of balanced game between enterprises and financial institutions.First of all,for financial institutions,high accounting information comparability will enhance financial information transparency,improve earnings quality and reduce information risk by inhibiting earnings management behavior of management.In order to improve operating performance and reduce operating risk,financial institutions will provide long-term debt financing to enterprises with high financial information transparency,high earnings quality and low information risk.Earnings management plays a mediating role in the effect of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure.This also indicates that after the reform of China's financial system and financial market began in 2007,the capital market can effectively identify the earnings management behavior of enterprises.Secondly,for enterprises,when the governance effect of short-term debt financing inhibiting agency cost is replaced by high comparability of accounting information,enterprises will increase their long-term debt financing willingness.Among the effects of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure,its mechanism can also be realized by suppressing agency costs.Agency cost plays a mediating role in the effect of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure.It is proved that accounting information comparability promotes cooperation in the game between enterprises and financial institutions.Finally,the government-led financial system and the financing advantage of SOEs'social responsibilities weaken the impact of SOEs' accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure.Compared with SOEs,the impact of non-SOEs' accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure is stronger.Conclusion three:Management equity incentive will affect the effect of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure,which will strengthen the effect of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure.Furthermore,the regulating effect of equity incentive has "Entrenchment Effect",and excessive incentive will be counterproductive.Compared with low intensity equity incentive,high intensity equity incentive strengthens the impact of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure by improving the comparability of accounting information,transmitting positive information of enterprise operation and governance to financial institutions and replacing the inhibiting effect of short-term debt financing on agency cost.However,when equity incentive is excessive,management equity incentive will negatively adjust the impact of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure by increasing earnings management behavior and improving aggressive degree of enterprise strategy,thus forming the "Entrenchment Effect".Possible innovations of this paper are mainly reflected in the following aspects:Firstly,aiming at the problem that the existing research on the impact of management equity incentive on the comparability of accounting information has not paid enough attention,this paper expands the research on the economic consequences of management equity incentive as well as the micro path and mechanism of action from the perspective of accounting information comparability,empirically studies the "Entrenchment Effect" of management equity incentive on the comparability of accounting information,and the effect shows an inverted U-shaped relationship,which provides new empirical evidence for the implementation of equity incentive by China Securities Regulatory Commission and enterprises in capital market.Expand the research on the economic consequences of aggressive degree of enterprise strategy,From the path of "Corporate Governance ?Business Behavior?Financial Consequences",tests the influence path and mechanism of aggressive degree of enterprise strategy as the intermediary effect in the process of management equity incentive affecting accounting information comparability,which is helpful to understand the mechanism of management equity incentive affecting accounting information comparability.In addition,from the perspective of management equity incentive,expands the research ideas on the influencing factors of accounting information comparability,and provides a new way of explanation and theoretical support for enterprises to improve accounting information comparability.Secondly,combined with the background of the reform of China's financial system and financial market in 2007,the paper systematically analyzes and reveals the effect,influence path and mechanism of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure.According to the information asymmetry theory and principal-agent theory,based on the research ideas of "Accounting Information Comparability?Earnings Management?Debt Maturity Structure",the influence path of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure is tested.At the same time,tests whether the capital market can identify the problem of earnings management after the reform of China's financial system.Based on the research path of "Accounting Information Comparability?Two Types of Agency Costs?Debt Maturity Structure",explores the influence mechanism of accounting information comparability on two types of agency costs and corporate debt maturity structure.These provide theoretical explanations and empirical evidence for the influence path and mechanism of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure,deepen the academic theoretical cognition of the relationship between accounting information comparability and corporate financing activities and debt maturity structure,and make up for the deficiency of existing research literature.In addition,fully analyzes the effect of the heterogeneity of enterprise ownership nature on the relationship between the two,and deepens the research on the influence of the comparability of accounting information in the dimension of enterprise ownership nature heterogeneity on the debt maturity structure.Last but not least,the study confirms the moderating effect of management equity incentive on the relationship between accounting information comparability and debt maturity structure.Management equity incentive will strengthen the impact of accounting information comparability on debt maturity structure.Furthermore,excessive incentive will be counterproductive and form the "Entrenchment Effect" of the moderating effect of equity incentive.Since the Securities Regulatory Commission implemented the Administrative Measures for Equity Incentive of Listed Companies(Trial)in 2006,and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and the Ministry of Finance issued a series of documents such as the Trial Measures for Equity Incentive of State-holding Listed Companies(Domestic),the system construction and operation of equity incentive tend to deepen and standardize,but the management equity incentive is still in the development stage in China,and its extensive influence consequences and the underlying action path and mechanism need to be further explored.This research conclusion expands the research on the influencing factors of debt maturity structure from the perspective of the comparability of equity incentive and accounting information,and deepens the research on the economic consequences of management equity incentive from the perspective of the relationship between the comparability of accounting information and debt maturity structure. |
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