| After the subprime crisis,when the high leverage ratio of the real economy sector caused by China's credit expansion has not been eliminated,China's economy has entered a new normal.Under the downward pressure of the world economy,China's economic growth has slowed down.At this time,structural contradictions have become an important factor restricting China's economy to maintain high-quality development.Under the restriction of "dual control",the traditional monetary policy regulation method is inefficient.Therefore,in order to solve the structural contradictions in China's economy under the new normal,China's central bank has created a series of unconventional structural monetary policy tools.This alleviates the problem of unbalanced development in China's economic field.However,the dredging of monetary policy transmission channels is undoubtedly equally important.Based on this,this paper conducts research on the transmission channels of bank risk-taking,as follows: First,this paper firstly reviews and sorts out the existing domestic and foreign relevant researches on the traditional monetary policy transmission channel,in order to compare with the existing domestic and foreign relevant literatures on the bank risk taking transmission channel,so as to better understand it.Secondly,this paper first briefly discusses the transmission mechanism and transmission effect of the traditional monetary policy transmission channel,so as to have a better grasp of the transmission channel of bank risk taking.On this basis,In the operating target in the study of this paper,intermediary goal,and the ultimate goal has carried on the related definition,based on this,this paper discusses its in transmission mechanism of monetary policy in macroeconomic target adjustment and possible conduction effect,In addition,this paper also discusses the mechanism of its existence.Thirdly,the great Depression of the United States,The Economic crisis of Japan,and the subprime crisis of the United States are selected as case studies to investigate their role in the real financial or economic crisis;Fourthly,the DSGE model suitable for this paper is constructed,and based on the research content of this paper,the premise assumptions of model operation are put forward,and related behavior equations of bank risk taking transmission channel are introduced into the model,so as to lay an empirical foundation for the research problems of this paper.Fifthly,based on the question of "what is the transmission channel of bank risk-taking",this paper firstly tests its existence.In addition,in the case of different banks' risk preference and risk tolerance,the differences of transmission mechanism and transmission effect are discussed,and the transmission path is proposed systematically.Sixth,this paper sets up the reward and punishment mechanism of loan contract in the DSGE model,and considers how it regulates the policy objectives through the transmission channel of bank risk taking,and what is the effect of regulation.The results show that :(1)the transmission channel of bank risk-taking is effective in the regulation of monetary policy to macroeconomic objectives,and this effect presents different effects under different bank risk preferences.When the risk preference,that is,the bank's willingness to take risks,increases,the bank will adopt the "high risk and high return" lending strategy.At this time,the proportion of high risk credit investment in the bank's asset portfolio will increase,while the proportion of low risk credit investment will decrease,and the financial risk will increase,and the credit scale and output of SMEs will increase.This shows that financial stability and "double control" are two opposite policy goals,that is,the increase of smes' credit is inevitably accompanied by the rise of financial risks,but it is feasible as long as it is under control.In addition,this paper also studies the "finacle-like accelerator effect" of banks' risk taking transmission channel.(2)Under the assumption of different monetary policies and different risk preferences of banks,this paper finds that in the process of banks' risk tolerance from low to high,there will be differences in the transmission mechanism and transmission effect of banks' risk taking transmission channel.Specifically,with the increase of risk tolerance,the transmission mechanism and transmission effect of bank risk taking transmission channel will be different under four different combinations of interest rate hike and risk preference,interest rate cut and risk aversion,interest rate cut and risk aversion.(3)The transmission mechanism and effect of bank risk-taking transmission channel under different monetary policies,different risk preferences and different risk tolerance are compared and analyzed.The results show that Under different monetary policies and risk preference assumptions,with the increase of risk tolerance,the transmission mechanism and transmission effect of monetary policy will be different depending on the leading transmission channel,that is,the leading role of interest rate or the leading role of bank risk taking.(4)This paper also introduces a reward and punishment mechanism in the loan contract signed by smes and banks,which depends on the credit default situation of smes,and the effect of the reward and punishment mechanism will vary with the risk preference of banks.For the risk-loving banks that adopt the "high risk and high return" lending strategy,when the credit standing of smes is good,the credit scale and output of smes will increase under the action of the reward and punishment mechanism,while the potential financial risks will increase.For risk-averse banks,when the external environment deteriorates,such as in the tightening monetary policy cycle,SMEs will be reluctant to lend even if they have good credit standing.The main contributions of this paper are :(1)Different from the existing scattered studies,this paper systematically studies the transmission channel of monetary policy according to the traditional mode of "operational target-intermediary target-ultimate goal",and puts forward its specific transmission path.In addition,the conduction mechanism and effect are discussed.(2)This paper introduces the reward and punishment mechanism of loan contract into it,investigating how it regulates the macroeconomic policy objectives through the transmission channel of bank risk taking,and how its transmission mechanism and transmission effect will change.(3)Based on the existing DSGE model,this paper introduces behavioral equations related to the transmission channel of bank risk taking,such as the standard equation of bank credit approval including risk preference and risk tolerance.So as to provide technical support for the problems to be studied in this paper.The disadvantages of this paper are :(1)First of all,although the risk mechanism introduced in the model in this paper conforms to certain realistic conditions,it may lack certain theoretical support due to the lack of relevant researches;Secondly,the risk preference and risk tolerance of banks in this paper are exogenous.Although this does not affect the theoretical research on the transmission channel of bank risk-taking in this paper,it is still a pity that this paper does not conduct research on the model endobiochemistry.(2)This article is that the Banks risk bearing transmission channels in the effect of macroeconomic regulation,based on the research of this paper is a macro level,and the limitations of real data about economic structure,this article may lack a certain micro data base,however,with the constant improvement of relevant data,in the future study,Micro empirical research will be carried out on it.(3)The research focuses more on the "what" of the transmission channel of bank risk-taking,while the research on its specific application is relatively weak and only considers the influencing factors of the reward and punishment mechanism of loan contract.Therefore,monetary policy tools and macro-prudential management will increase their influence in reality in the future. |
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