The Study Of Financing And Ordering Decisions In A Supply Chain Under Bargaining

Capital constraint has been a key problem restricting the development of many small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs).In today's business practice,the representative financing schemes the capital constrained enterprises utilize mainly include single debt financing(such as trade credit and bank credit),and mixed financing combining equity financing with debt financing.Under the single debt financing scheme,both trade credit and bank credit can redu ce the operational risks of capital constrained enterpreses.However,it is generally difficult for many SMEs to obtain loans from banks due to failure to cross the credit threshold of financial institutions.Meanwhile,capital constrained enterprises plagued by financing problem suffer from financial pressure from the powerful core enterprises due to a lack of bargaining power.Under the mixed financing scheme combining equity financing with debt financing,because of the advantage of borrowing without collateral,equity financing can lower financial costs of capital constrained enterprises to some extent,and improves the bargaining powers of enterprises under the mixed financing scheme.Different financing scheme will lead to a different bargaining power for each member,which directly affects the distribution of the overall profit of the supply chain among all members,thereby influencing the financing choices of capital constrained enterprises.Therefore,we take different financing schemes and the bargaining power of supply chain enterprises as the entry point,and mainly focus on the financing and ordering decisions of capital constrained enterprises under bargaining game.The main research is as follows:First,we study the financing and ordering decisions in a supply chain with a single retailer under bargaining.Under the stochastic market demand,the capital constrained retailer adopts two financing schemes including bank credit and trade credit to achieve optimal ordering.Based on traditional decentralized decision--making model,we construct the financing and ordering models in the supply chain with a single retailer under bargaining game,and derive the optimal decisions of supply chain members under different financing schemes.We further examine the impact of the bargaining power on the supply chain members' optimal decisions and financing preferences.The results indicate that comparing with the decentralized decision-making model,with a wholesale price contract the bargaining game can create more value for the supply chain,and achieve Pareto improvement and supply chain coordination.Second,we study the financing and ordering decisions in a supply chain with two competitive retailers under bargaining.For a supply chain with a supplier and two capital constrained retailers,the supplier bargains with two retailers over wholesale prices.The core supplier can strategically provide trade credit to one or two retailers.We mainly analyze the optimal decisions under three different financing cases,and investigate the impacts of the bank loan ratio and players' bargaining powers on equilibrium results.We further explore the conditions under which the supplier tends to cooperate with one of the retailers and the other retailer dropping out of the market is allowed to enter the market.The results indicate if the competition intensity and the supplier's bargaining power meet some certain conditions,the supplier is willing to cooperate with one of the retailers;for the retailer who drops out of the market,if its individual bargaining power is below a certain threshold,he can use external a hybrid financing scheme to break the monopoly between its competitor and the core enterprise.Third,we study the financing and ordering decisions in two competitive supply chains under bargaining.For two competitive supply chains with two suppliers and two capital constrained retailers,both suppliers can sell directly to consumers or through downstream retailers indirectly.Both retailers can adopt two financing schemes including trade credit and external hybrid financing to achieve their optimal orderings.We construct the financing and ordering models under different financing schemes to derive the optimal decisions and profits.Then we further explore the suppliers' sales channel preferences and obtain the equilibrium channel structure under different financing schemes.Comparing each player 's profits between different financing schemes,we obtain players' financing preferences.Fourth,this paper studies the financing and ordering decisions in a dual-channel supply chain under bargaining.In a supply chain with a supplier and a capital constrained retailer,the retailer may adopt two financing schemes including trade credit and external hybrid financing to achieve the optimal ordering.The supplier with sufficient funds considers setting up a direct channel on the basis of the traditional retail channel.We construct the financing and ordering models under different financing schemes and characterize the players' optimal decisions.We further examine the impacts of the retailer 's bank loan ratio and players' bargaining powers on the equilibrium results.Finanlly,we make a comparative analysis to derive the supplier's optimal sales channel choice and all players' financing preferences.