Study On The Evolution Of Group Cooperative Behavior Under Negative Incentive

The evolution of cooperation is one of the most challenging scientific issues.As a common altruistic behavior,the emergence and evolution of cooperation has attracted the attention of experts and scholars in many fields,while the social dilemma of maximizing individual interests and collective interests still exists.The cooperative behavior decision-making theory based on game model,as a method to quantitatively describe the group cooperation process and individual altruistic behavior,is the basis and premise for effective analysis,prediction and control of group behavior.With the development of behavioral game theory and experimental economics,economists have found many altruistic behaviors by analyzing the behavior of economic people,and have conducted a more in-depth analysis of the maintenance and production of cooperative behavior using multidisciplinary research and analysis methods.The current research believes that the maintenance of cooperative behavior mainly depends on five reciprocity mechanisms.Although the five different reciprocity mechanisms have different forms,they have one common ground point,that is,participants will identify cooperators when playing games,rather than randomly select individuals to play games.This reciprocity model can only explain the evolution of cooperation in a narrow range.Therefore,the strong reciprocity cooperation model is proposed to overcome the limitations of the above reciprocity model.Strong reciprocity refers to individuals who are willing to sacrifice their own profits,reward fairness(positive incentives)and punish unfair behaviors(negative incentives).In particular,the negative incentive mechanism that needs to pay costs has been widely studied and discussed.In order to explore the impact of negative incentive mechanism on behavior dynamics and human altruistic decision-making,this paper uses behavioral economics analysis methods,statistical analysis,evolutionary game theory,statistical physics research methods,replication dynamic equations and other methods to design human behavior statistical experiments with strong reciprocity mechanism and establish evolutionary game dynamics model of negative incentive behavior decision-making.It is of great practical significance to study the impact of negative incentive mechanism on cooperative behavior from both experimental and theoretical aspects.The specific research content is mainly divided into the following five parts.1、In the experimental study of prisoner’s dilemma behavior with positive and negative incentives,we designed and organized three directly interactive prisoner’s dilemma game experiments by organizing college students in Chinese universities.These three experiments are: the two-person prisoner’s dilemma game experiment(CDpr)with positive and negative incentives,and the two-person prisoner’s dilemma game experiment(CDR)with only positive incentives,and a two-person prisoner’s dilemma game experiment(CDp)with only negative incentive mechanism.Then,using the behavioral decision-making experimental data,we compared and analyzed the behavioral evolution results under these three mechanisms.The experimental results show that negative incentive behavior will reduce the effectiveness of positive incentive behavior in promoting cooperation and social average income,and negate the correlation between positive incentive and negative incentive.The potential reasons for using positive and negative incentives are not caused by the preference for fairness and the aversion to unfairness.Negative motivation is due to individual retaliation,while positive motivation is due to individual pro-social attribute.We believe that negative motivation is not a specific promotion of cooperation,but a selfish strategy of individuals to protect themselves from potential competitors.2、In the study of the stability and maintenance mechanism of negative incentive in network games,we discuss the evolution characteristics and rules of different negative incentive strategies in structured spatial networks.In the first stage,individuals can gain income through donation game.In the second stage,the individual will respond to the opponent’s strategy in the first stage,either not punishing him,or punishing his cooperation,or punishing his defection.The simulation results show that the cost of punishment and fine have an impact on the effectiveness of network reciprocity.When the cost of punishment is relatively low,antisocial punishment and arbitrary punishment will destroy the reciprocity effect of the network.With the increase of penalty fines,the individuals of antisocial punishment and arbitrary punishment will disappear,and the network will be occupied by unpunished and prosocial punishment cooperators.However,if the punishment cost is too high,the pro-social punisher will lose the economic advantage.The network reciprocity effect is not enough to support the high fine,and finally the system is dominated by the defector.3、In the stability and maintenance mechanism of negative incentive behavior in the coupling network,we discussed the impact of asymmetric negative incentive mechanism on the evolution of cooperation in the coupling network,where punishment is only implemented between players in different network layers,and no punishment is implemented between the same layer of networks.In particular,only the top players have the right to punish the bottom players,but otherwise.In the model of this chapter,we consider two kinds of punishment:(1)the prosocial punishment of cooperators punishing defectors and(2)the anti-social punishment of defectors punishing cooperators.After extensive numerical simulation,the results show that if the penalty cost is relatively high,the strategies in the two networks have a synergy phenomenon,and there are gradually evolving clusters of collaborators,and the individuals in the clusters gain higher profits.However,if the penalty cost is relatively low,synergy will not occur,but cooperation will still spread.The results show that in the case of asymmetric interaction,the evolution of cooperation will change.4、In the study of the impact of positive and negative incentives driven by environmental feedback on the evolution of cooperative behavior,we assume that positive and negative incentives are real,and discuss the evolution dynamics of the environment game mutual feedback system,where the gain factor of public goods game is defined as the combination of positive and negative incentives of the environment.In the twodimensional system model of mutual feedback of environment-public product game with mutation,the gain factor is affected by the environmental state and incentive factorθ1and θ2.Different from the traditional punishment and reward strategies,the positive and negative incentive effects of the environment on individuals are not reflected from the traditional individual strategies,but the dynamic impact on the gain factors of public goods.We objectively describe the final evolution state of the system under the combination of different incentive factors,and describe the conditions for maintaining the system cooperation and avoiding the tragedy of the commons.The mutation rate has a significant impact on the dynamic evolution state of this two-dimensional system,and shows the tragedy of oscillation of the commons within a certain range of parameters.This chapter proves theoretically that the tragedy of the concussion commons is a stable limit cycle,which may have a new explanation for the switching of the sustained oscillation strategy.5、In the study of the impact of negative incentives on the evolution of cooperative behavior in the social dilemma game with exit options,we assume that players have the right to choose the game state,and the two states are active state(participating in the game)and inactive state(exiting the game).However,in the structured group,the individuals who take the initiative to withdraw from the game have destroyed the original organizational structure to a certain extent.Those individuals who take the initiative to withdraw from the game group have received negative incentives from the third party,that is,they must bear a certain penalty of γ as punishment for their withdrawal from the structured group.The results show that if the exit penalty is moderate,the system can reach the state of full cooperation,in which the cooperators can rapidly spread under the network reciprocity mechanism.Inactive participants can only exist at the edge of the cooperator cluster,which creates a critical buffer for the cooperators at the edge of the cluster,and makes the marginal cooperators avoid the invasion of the defector.Therefore,this buffering effect of inactive players forms the basis for enhancing network reciprocity.