Research On The Related Party Transaction Regulation Of Insurance Companies In China

In 2006,China drawing on the core regulatory principles of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors,formally issued the "guidance on standardizing the governance structure of insurance companies ",and established the " three pillars" regulatory system of market behavior supervision,solvency supervision and corporate governance supervision.As an important part of corporate governance supervision,the regulatory system of related party transactions has gradually developed and improved.In recent years,the insurance market has appeared Anbang group,life group,tomorrow group,and other risk institutions,which brings serious harm to the steady operation of the insurance industry.Reflecting on the root of the problem,it is mainly the long-term failure of corporate governance mechanism,and the actual controller breaks through the virtual internal supervision mechanism conveys improper benefits,hollowing out insurance companies and harming consumer interests.In the whole chain of behavior,related party transaction is the last level of damage,and the use of insurance funds is the most important channel for the transmission of benefits.How to improve the scientific nature of supervision and strengthen the behavior constraints of related party transactions is an important practical subject facing supervision.At present,the academic research on related party transaction supervision is mainly aimed at listed companies,but there is basically no use of insurance companies or insurance capital.Taking into account the remarkable characteristics of the insurance industry and insurance funds in related transaction mode,characteristics,and supervision,the characteristics of insurance funds can be deeply analyzed from the basic view of layer logic,this paper studies and formulates a suitable and efficient related party transaction supervision system.Analyzing the internal relationship and logical orientation between related party transaction supervision and corporate governance supervision from the perspective of control right can reveal the mechanism of interaction between them and clarify the scope boundary of supervision means and supervision expectation.To improve the effectiveness of related party transaction supervision,we need to strengthen the behavior constraint on related party transactions,and at the same time,we need to reconstruct the operation mechanism of corporate governance supervision,the direction is to restrain the endogenous motive force of related party transactions through regulating control right.Considering the complexity of the related transaction of risk capital,the legislative regulation of related transactions should also analyze and obey the deep rule of its operation and its personality characteristics.Of course,the particularity of the insurance industry and the use of insurance capital not only increases the difficulty of supervision but also provides a richer strategic choice for strengthening supervision.By comparing the regulatory experience of the United States and Germany and the practice of interbank supervision of banks and securities in China,it can provide a path reference for improving the regulation of related party transactions in China.From the analysis of constructing a more scientific and efficient related party transaction regulatory framework,we should promote the development of corporate governance regulation to control regulation as the center of the development iteration,explore the establishment of personalized,in line with the characteristics of the industry checks and balances mechanism,while establishing a behavior-oriented related party transaction supervision management rules,strengthen the direct supervision and monitoring of related party transactions,and take corresponding measures from the aspects of fair review procedure norms,proportional restrictions,penetration principles,information disclosure,regulatory measures,and judicial relief.