Research On The Impact Of Large Shareholders’ Trading Market Behavior On Corporate Performance

As a special form of modern entrepreneurs,major shareholders have an important influence on the operation of the capital market and the operation of listed companies.How to effectively identify the economic consequences of major shareholders’ trading market behavior is a hot area that both the practical and theoretical circles pay attention to.In May 2019,Yi Huiman,chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission,proposed that major shareholders must adhere to the bottom line of "not harming the interests of listed companies." In October 2020,the State Council issued the "Opinions on Further Improving the Quality of Listed Companies",which fully reflects the State Council’s great emphasis on "improving the quality of listed companies".Due to the lack of external supervision and the rule of law environment that still needs to be improved,the behaviors of large shareholders infringing on the interests of small and medium investors occur frequently and are more hidden,making identification more difficult.At the same time,major shareholders have greater enthusiasm to supervise the managers,so as to avoid company losses caused by ineffective supervision.Scholars have always been divided in the research of whether the role of major shareholders in China’s listed companies is "supervisor" or "tunneling".At present,many scholars have explored the corporate governance effects of large shareholders from the controlling level,and the research on the consequences of large shareholders’ trading market behaviors needs to be enriched and is equally controversial.Therefore,based on the new market behavior characteristics of major shareholders in recent years,this dissertation studies the impact of major shareholders’ transaction market behavior on company operating performance,with a view to revealing its economic consequences from the perspective of micro-company operating performance.Exploring this issue has important research significance and research value for regulating the trading market behavior of major shareholders,promoting the high-quality development of listed companies in the new era,preventing and dissolving market risks,and promoting the healthy development of the capital market.This dissertation takes the trading market behavior of major shareholders as the research object,explores the impact of major shareholders’ transaction market behaviors on company performance,clarifies the concept and connotation of major shareholders’ transaction market behavior,and includes cash dividends,large stock dividends,major shareholders’ stock selling and equity pledge into the scope of major shareholders’ transaction market behavior.At the same time,it sorts out and summarizes the theoretical basis of the issues in this dissertation,sorts out and reviews the relevant research results of the trading market behavior of major shareholders,and qualitatively analyzes the internal connection and pros and cons of the major shareholders’ trading market behaviors,and discusses the mechanism of cash dividends,large stock dividends,major shareholders’ stock selling and equity pledge affecting company performance.On this basis,it studies the effect of major shareholders’ trading market behavior on company performance,analyzes the influence of external environmental factors,product market competition and internal environmental factors,equity structure on the relationship between the two,that is to explore the difference in the impact of major shareholders’ trading market behavior on company performance under different product market competition and equity structure conditions.Finally,under the premise of considering the relationship between different major shareholders’ transaction market behaviors and their influence mechanism on company performance,the crossinfluence effects of different major shareholders’ transaction market behaviors on company performance are further studied.The specific content and conclusions of this dissertation are as follows:First,in terms of the internal correlations between major shareholders’ transaction market behaviors and their mechanism on company performance,there is a certain internal correlation between major shareholders’ transaction market behaviors.To a certain extent,cash dividends,large stock dividends,stock selling and equity pledge are the behavioral performance of major shareholders to obtain cash flow directly or indirectly.Moreover,theoretically speaking,the market behavior of major shareholders has a signaling effect,corporate governance effect,and financing effect on company performance,that is,it will affect the company’s performance by affecting the information asymmetry between the company and investors,affecting agency issues or the allocation of control rights,and affecting the company’s internal and external capital allocation,thus affecting company performance.Second,in terms of the impact of cash dividends on company performance,the extent of cash dividends,the continuity of cash dividends,and normal distribution behavior are positively correlated with company performance,while abnormal distribution behavior is the opposite.The degree of product market competition and equity balance can positively adjust the relationship between the degree of cash dividends and company performance,while the degree of equity concentration and the nature of state-owned equity play a negative regulatory role.Third,in terms of the impact of large stock dividends on company performance,large stock dividends can help improve company performance.Product market competition and equity concentration will negatively regulate the relationship between the two,while equity balance and the nature of state-owned equity will play a positive regulatory effect.Furthermore,the situational effect of cash dividends is significant,and cash dividends can positively adjust the impact of large stock dividends on company performance.Fourth,in terms of the impact of major shareholders’ stock selling on company performance,major shareholders’ stock selling is not conducive to the improvement of company performance.The negative impact is mainly reflected in the sub-sample of controlling shareholders’ stock selling.Product market competition and the nature of non-state-owned equity will significantly enhance this negative impact.The degree of equity concentration can restrain the negative impact of controlling shareholders’ stock selling on company performance,but the degree of equity balance will strengthen the adverse impact.Furthermore,cash dividends significantly weakened the negative impact of major shareholders’ stock selling on company performance.Large stock dividends did not significantly affect the relationship between major shareholders’ stock selling and company performance,that is,large stock dividends did not play an obvious moderating role.Fifth,in terms of the impact of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge behavior on company performance,the former has a significant negative impact on the latter.Other major shareholders’ equity pledge will increase the negative impact.In the case of continuous pledge by controlling shareholders,the company’s performance will be lower.Product market competition,the degree of equity balance,and the nature of nonstate-owned equity will reinforce this negative impact,while equity concentration is the opposite.Furthermore,cash dividends,large stock dividends and stock selling have a significant moderating effect on the relationship between controlling shareholders’ equity pledge and company performance.Cash dividends inhibit the negative impact of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on company performance.Both large stock dividends and stock selling have strengthened the negative effect of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge on company performance.Based on the above research conclusions,this dissertation puts forward the following recommendations:(1)Strengthen the information disclosure supervision and transaction monitoring of the major shareholders’ trading market behavior,guide major shareholders to make appropriate behavior choices,and help investors effectively distinguish various behaviors;(2)Cultivate a good external market environment,shape a scientific market competition mechanism,and give full play to the governance effects of product market competition;(3)Improve the company’s internal governance structure,rationally optimize the company’s equity structure,and build an effective equity balance mechanism;(4)Give full play to the positive synergistic effects of major shareholders’ trading market behaviors and avoid negative interaction effects;(5)Broaden the financing channels of listed companies,ease the financing constraints of listed companies,especially ease the financing constraints of private companies,and promote the deep integration of finance and the real economy.