Research On Financing Selection Strategy Of Capital Constrained Supply Chain

Capital constraint is an important factor that a?ects the operation decisions of supply chain enterprises and restricts the development of upstream and downstream small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs).Supply chain finance e?ectively alleviates the financing di culties of SMEs in the supply chain.However,under the influence of random market demand,in face of the bankruptcy risk,risk aversion behaviour of decisionmakers and environmental policy risk,how to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of various financing methods and choose financing modes according to SMEs’ own situation is an urgent problem to be solved in the field of operation management.This dissertation takes the financing strategy selection of the capital-constrained supply chain as the research object.Through the actual investigation of the financing situation of SMEs in the supply chain,the comprehensive application of supply chain management theory,game theory and optimization theory.Aiming at the financing characteristics and di culties of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain in practice,this dissertation compares and studies the internal and external financing modes in the supply chain,and obtains the optimal financing equilibrium strategies of di?erent chain members.The main research work of this dissertation includes the following aspects:First of all,in view of the bankruptcy risk and inventory risk faced by small and medium-sized suppliers in the supply chain.This dissertation constructs a Stackelberg game model,in which the retailer is the leader,the supplier is the follower.The dissertation compares and analyzes two financing strategies: early payment financing and reverse factoring financing.Under the framework of the pull supply chain,the inventory risks and bankruptcy risks faced by the supplier are depicted.This dissertation obtains the optimal operation and financing decisions of supply chain members,and analyzes the influence of cost,payment period and retailer’s credit level on the choice of financing strategy.The dissertation results show that both early payment financing and reverse factoring financing can alleviate the shortage of funds for the supplier.Based on the high-quality credit of the core buyer of the supply chain,the supplier prefers reverse factoring financing.Although this financing extends the supplier’s accounts receivable collection period,it also reduces its financing costs.Under the reverse factoring financing model,the cooperation between the supplier and the retailer with higher credit levels can not only increase its production and the retailer’s wholesale price,but also achieve the optimal overall performance of the supply chain.Secondly,in view of the influence of supply chain members’ risk-averse behavioural preferences on financing decision-making,this dissertation constructs a Stackelberg game model,in which the supplier is the leader and the retailer is the follower.The dissertation compares and analyzes two financing methods to alleviate the buyer’s financial di culties: credit guarantee financing and trade credit.Under the framework of a push supply chain,the retailer faces random market demand and risk of bankruptcy.The dissertation adopts the Conditional Value at Risk(CVa R)method to describe the influence of supply chain members’ risk-averse behaviour on the choice of operation and financing strategy.The dissertation finds that when the supplier’s riskaverse degree is at a certain level,both parties in the supply chain can benefit,and moderate risk aversion is conducive to the maintenance of the supply chain.Comparing the two financing strategies,it is found that the members of the supply chain usually have di?erent financing preferences.However,there exists a region where trade credit financing outperforms credit guarantee financing for both players.Finally,considering the impact of current environmental policies,and further analyzing the financing decision-making issues of capital-constrained companies under the carbon emission control environment.This dissertation constructs a green credit financing model in a supply chain system composed of a su ciently funded supplier and a capital-constrained manufacturer to demonstrate the operation and financing decisions of the green manufacturer under strict carbon emission restrictions.In order to illustrate the e?ectiveness of green credit financing,green credit financing and traditional trade credit financing are compared and analyzed,and the optimal operation and financing balance of supply chain members under the two financing modes are obtained.The dissertation results show that under relatively strict carbon emission policies,the manufacturer and the supplier can achieve a win-win situation with appropriate green investment,while under relatively loose carbon emission policies,the manufacturer and the supplier have opposite financing preferences.And under the trade credit financing model,the government can formulate strict carbon emission penalties to encourage companies to make green investments,and this rigorous measure is also beneficial to the manufacturer.The dissertation finds that the government or the environmental protection department can set di?erent carbon emission thresholds to guide manufacturers to choose the appropriate financing model to achieve a win-win situation for maximizing social welfare and corporate profits.