| Agricultural insurance subsidy is a prerequisite for the formation of the agricultural insurance market and an important tool for promoting the development of agricultural insurance and improving the level of agricultural insurance protection.Since the implementation of China’s centrally subsidized agricultural insurance policy in 2007,agricultural insurance premiums have gradually increased,and the total amount of premium subsidies from governments at all levels now accounts for about 75% of the total premium income,which has greatly promoted the rapid development of agricultural insurance in China.However,since the central government decided to divide the ratio of premium subsidies between the central and local governments according to the eastern and central and western regions,the problem of sloppy premium subsidies has been widely criticized,intensifying with the growth of premium scale.How to promote fine-grained subsidies for agricultural insurance? How to achieve fairness in subsidy spending among provinces? How to reduce the pressure on government financial resources in the process of continuously improving the level of protection? These issues have gradually become the focus of academic circles and the issues that must be addressed in realizing high-quality development of agricultural insurance in China.However,although there are some theoretical discussions on these issues,there are still gaps in the quantitative research.Based on the current situation of agricultural insurance premium subsidies in China,this paper first briefly introduces the historical development of agricultural insurance premium subsidies in China,and at the same time calculates the difference in demand and supply pressure of different local governments for agricultural insurance premium subsidies based on the current premium subsidy policy,so as to put forward the current problems of agricultural insurance premium subsidies in China.Secondly,taking the function of agricultural insurance as the starting point of the analysis,the policy objectives that the central and local governments intend to achieve by relying on the function of agricultural insurance are analyzed,and the responsibilities of the central government and local governments in terms of premium subsidies for different species,different regions and different insured subjects are divided under the guidance of their respective policy objectives.Furthermore,based on the policy objectives and premium subsidy expenditure responsibilities of the central and local governments,and based on the principle of fairness in premium subsidy expenditure of the central and local governments,an optimization model of the central and local governments’ premium subsidy sharing ratio is constructed based on the five major categories of cereals,cotton,oil,sugar and livestock subsidized by the central government,and the premium subsidy ratios of the central government to different provinces are simulated from both non-actuarial rates and actuarial rates.Finally,this paper simulates the total government subsidy ratio under different coverage levels while keeping the welfare level of the insured farmers unchanged,and designs a subsidy scheme that decreases the total government subsidy ratio sequentially in different coverage intervals,and simulates the premium subsidy sharing ratio of the central and local governments in China in different coverage growth intervals according to this subsidy scheme.Based on the theoretical analysis and simulation results,this paper draws the following conclusions:1)The way of dividing the ratio of agricultural insurance premium subsidies between the central government and local governments according to the east and the central and west is rather crude and does not narrow the differences in the level of demand and supply capacity of agricultural insurance premium subsidies from region to region and from province to province.2)The central government should be mainly responsible for premium subsidies for food and important agricultural products,while local governments should be mainly responsible for premium subsidies for insurance of agricultural products with local characteristics;the ratio of premium subsidies transfer payments from the central government to different provinces should also be different,and the central government needs to be tilted towards less developed and difficult areas to reduce the pressure of financial expenditure in provinces with weaker financial capacity.3)The central and local governments’ premium subsidy sharing method based on regional equity can increase the variability of the proportion of central premium subsidies received among provinces,so that the central government subsidy funds flow to provinces with a higher financial subsidy burden;while following the principle of regional fiscal expenditure equity,optimizing the central and local governments’ premium subsidy sharing ratio according to actuarial rates can further reduce the pressure of premium subsidies in high-risk areas and improve the accuracy of subsidy funds.4)Theoretically,the government premium subsidy ratio is negatively correlated with the coverage level,and the model of decreasing government subsidy ratio by distinguishing the coverage interval can stabilize or even reduce the pressure of government financial subsidies and effectively avoid moral hazard. |