| Among the first batch of boards piloting the registration system,the Sci-Tech Innovation Board,giving high priority to the innovation-driven development strategy,develops a clear and explicit evaluation system for its scientific and technological innovation attributes and continues to leverage its leading advantages in gathering companies in the field of scientific and technological innovation.The board has attracted many large companies with leading research and development(R&D)capabilities and outstanding profitability and is gradually evolving into a hub for companies with "key & core technologies." It also played an essential role in promoting the effective integration of innovative tech companies and industries with capital.R&D investment is considered the core competitive advantage for innovative tech companies’ sustained and stable development.As key indicators for measuring the technological content of companies and for being listed on the Sci-Tech Innovation Board,managing,supervising,and evaluating R&D expenditures,personnel,and patents have naturally become the focus issues in the IPO screening process.Unlike the rigid performance requirements of the approval-based IPO system for companies,the registration system of the Sci-Tech Innovation Board no longer solely emphasizes the profitability of IPO companies.The diversified listing conditions demonstrate the inclusiveness of IPO screening on the Sci-Tech Innovation Board,but also pose new requirements and challenges to IPO companies’ information disclosure and IPO pricing.Studies have shown that many IPO companies manipulate their earnings in order to increase the passing rate of new stock and their pricing in the secondary market;as for the regulatory authorities’ attention to the innovation capabilities of companies listed on the Sci-Tech Innovation Board,there are frequent occurrences of R&D information "window dressing" before IPO companies listed on the Sci-Tech Innovation Board going public,such as sudden increases in R&D expenditures and adjustments in R&D personnel,which seriously affects the IPO pricing efficiency of these companies.On the other hand,in order to further improve the IPO pricing efficiency of companies listed on the Sci-Tech Innovation Board,the registration system has implemented an underwriter co-investment system to "bundle" the interests of underwriters with that of securities market investors,thereby curbing underwriters’ behavior of raising the offering price.Therefore,it is necessary to conduct an in-depth study on the R&D and innovation practices of companies listed on the Sci-Tech Innovation Board before and after IPO,and examine their impact on IPO pricing efficiency,as well as the role played by underwriters in the practices,to supervise the IPO companies listed Sci-Tech Innovation Board increasing real R&D investment,reduce R&D information "window dressing" behaviors,and improve the quality and IPO pricing efficiency.Given the above background,adopting theories such as asymmetric information theory,principal-agent theory,acceleration trap theory,and opportunistic behavior hypothesis,and taking China building prosperity through science and technology as the background and the characteristics of the Sci-Tech Innovation Board system,this thesis starts from the phenomenon of R&D information "window dressing" of IPO companies listed on the Sci-Tech Innovation Board,takes listed companies on the Sci-Tech Innovation Board from2019 to 2021 as research samples,and explores the relationship between the R&D information "window dressing" of companies listed on the Sci-Tech Innovation Board and the pricing of IPO companies,and further analyzes the differences in the impact of different methods or forms of R&D information "window dressing",and examines the role and economic consequences of underwriter reputation in curbing R&D information "window dressing" of IPO companies.It provides a new theoretical basis and reference experience for the securities regulatory authorities to further improve the new stock issuance system and standardize the information disclosure of "science and innovation" attributes on the Sci-Tech Innovation Board after the overall implementation of the registration system.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)Companies listed on Sci-Tech Innovation Board will conduct R&D "window dressing" before and after IPO,which is manifested by sudden increases in R&D expenditures intensity,the proportion of R&D personnel,patent strength,and the proportion of non-invention patents in the T-1 year before going public.Specifically,after being listed on the Sci-Tech Innovation Board,although there has been a significant increase in R&D expenditures and personnel in absolute terms,the ratio of operating income to total personnel has decreased,indicating that the investment in R&D resources will be reduced after the company goes public.The relevant conclusions remain robust after a series of endogeneity treatments and robustness tests such as instrumental variable testing,placebo test replacing the dependent variable,and sample-wise testing.In addition,this thesis also finds that the problem of R&D information "window dressing" is more prominent for companies with lower profits.(2)R&D information "window dressing" will reduce IPO pricing efficiency.The concealment of R&D "window dressing" exacerbates information asymmetry between companies and external investors,thereby increasing the degree of IPO underpricing and reducing IPO pricing efficiency.Further study of conducting a mediating effect test on the divergence of opinions among institutional investors in offline inquiry has found that R&D "window dressing" exacerbates the divergence of opinions among institutional investors and reduces the efficiency of IPO pricing.In addition,this thesis also finds that the R&D "window dressing" of companies will increase the passing rate;shareholders show their distrust of unprofitable companies and identify them as "junk" companies,leading to a high probability of falling on debut.They have yet to fully consider that these unprofitable companies can pass because they may have strong R&D capabilities.(3)As the sponsor of IPO companies,underwriters bear the responsibility of "gatekeepers" in IPO.Therefore,this thesis examines the role of underwriter reputation in curbing R&D information "window dressing" and improving IPO pricing efficiency.It finds that hiring reputable underwriters can effectively curb the intensity of IPO companies’ R&D information "window dressing," thereby alleviating the degree of IPO underpricing and improving IPO pricing efficiency.Further study finds that the more significant the proportion of underwriters’ co-investment,the lower the issuance price,the higher the degree of IPO underpricing,and the lower the efficiency of IPO pricing.This situation is more significant in companies with severe R&D information "window dressing";for reputable underwriters,the follow-up ratio can alleviate IPO underpricing and improve IPO pricing efficiency.In addition,the study also finds that the higher the information disclosure level,the better the IPO pricing efficiency.For IPO companies with high underwriter reputations,the role of information disclosure is more significant.For IPO companies with high social awareness,the positive impact of the underwriter’s reputation on IPO pricing will be weakened.(4)The capital market not only pays close attention to the IPO pricing of companies,but also continues to pay attention to the company value after going public.This thesis further examines the relationship between IPO companies’ R&D information "window dressing",reputation of underwriters and the value of companies after going public.It finds that IPO companies’ R&D information "window dressing" behavior will lead to a decline in their operational performance and long-term value after going public,and high-reputation underwriters can curb this negative phenomenon.Further study shows that companies with lower intensity of R&D information "window dressing" have more stable stock prices and are less affected by short-term fluctuations caused by the external environment.Based on the conclusions,the following policy recommendations are proposed.Firstly,the IPO screening of scientific and technological innovation indicators should be taken as the leverage for improving the R&D level of companies listed on the Sci-Tech Innovation Board and promoting the high-quality development of companies.For critical indicators such as R&D intensity and number of R&D personnel,substantive reviews and regulatory application of inquiry letters should be strengthened,and dynamic evaluation and continuous supervision should be conducted three to five years before and after IPO so as to curb companies’ sudden R&D information "window dressing" for going public.Secondly,the regulatory power of the third-party institutions over information disclosure of IPO companies should be strengthened and institutional investors should be allowed to conduct third-party reviews of relevant information,including R&D,in a bid to improve the new stock issuance system of companies listed on the Sci-Tech Innovation Board;investment institutions should be allowed to participate more in the information disclosure and verification process of IPO companies,and doubts about past decisions should be raised to ensure the right of all sectors of society to be informed and to participate.Thirdly,companies should be encouraged to disclose more details of R&D indicators to curb various IPO hype behaviors of using "science and technology innovation" as a gimmick.Fourthly,companies’ digital transformation should be promoted to improve the transparency of R&D indicators in the digital process.Possible innovation points of this thesis:Firstly,from the perspective of "window dressing" research and development information of IPO companies on the Science and Technology Innovation Board,it enriches relevant research on how IPO companies "window dressing" information to achieve listing purposes.Based on the opportunistic motivation of enterprises to increase the probability of IPO success,although existing literature has explored the earnings management and R&D information "window dressing" behavior of IPO companies more,scholars still explore the R&D information "window dressing" phenomenon of IPO companies from the perspective of earnings "window dressing",and less analyze other R&D information "window dressing" behavior of IPO companies.However,unlike the rigid requirements of previous approval and approval systems on the profitability indicators of IPO companies,the Sci Tech Innovation Board places more emphasis on the Sci Tech innovation attributes of IPO companies and sets detailed listing standards for R&D indicators.This unique standard may change the motivation and method of IPO companies’ R&D information "window dressing",thus providing a new research scenario for exploring the behavior of IPO companies’ R&D information "window dressing".Therefore,although this thesis draws on the theoretical foundation and relevant literature of earnings management,the research focus is not on earnings management,but on the research and development information "window dressing" behavior of IPO companies on the Science and Technology Innovation Board under the influence of the requirements of science and technology innovation attributes under the background of the registration system.Secondly,from the perspective of "window dressing" the research and development information of IPO companies on the Science and Technology Innovation Board,the relevant literature on the impact of issuer behavior on IPO pricing has been enriched.The research on IPO pricing has always been an important research direction in the field of corporate finance,and the related research that affects the efficiency of IPO pricing has received considerable attention from scholars.To explore the issue of IPO underpricing,scholars have conducted many studies from the perspectives of IPO company information disclosure,investor sentiment,and intermediary behavior of underwriters.However,most of the research is based on the conclusions drawn from the mature securities market or China’s main board market’s new stock issuance system.With the implementation of the registration system on the Science and Technology Innovation Board,in recent years,relevant topics related to the pricing of new stock issuance under the registration system have gradually received attention from scholars.Although a few scholars have explored the efficiency of IPO pricing in China’s market-oriented new stock issuance system on the Science and Technology Innovation Board from aspects such as information disclosure,inquiry letters,institutional investors,and intermediaries,the relevant literature based on information disclosure mainly focuses on the financial information of IPO companies,prospectus text information There is little literature on the factors affecting IPO pricing from the perspective of "window dressing" the R&D information of IPO companies on the Science and Technology Innovation Board,as discussed in terms of inquiry letters or response texts.This thesis is based on the perspective of "window dressing" research and development information,enriching the relevant literature on the impact of IPO behavior on IPO pricing on the Science and Technology Innovation Board.Thirdly,relevant research on the economic consequences of underwriters’ reputation mechanisms has been expanded from the perspective of high reputation underwriters suppressing the "window dressing" behavior of research and development information of IPO companies on the Science and Technology Innovation Board.Underwriter reputation can help alleviate information asymmetry in new stock issuance.Currently,the analysis mechanism of reputation in literature is mainly based on hypotheses such as "signal" and "information intermediary" in information economics.There is little literature specifically exploring the role path or channel of underwriter reputation in reality,this article provides a path of action based on the perspective of "window dressing" research and development information: underwriter reputation works by suppressing the "window dressing" behavior of enterprise research and development information.In addition,the current literature on underwriter reputation mechanisms is relatively scattered and not systematic,with only a small amount of literature exploring the impact of underwriter co investment system on IPO underpricing.The impact of underwriter reputation mechanisms on IPO company behavior,IPO pricing,and long-term value of the company still needs further testing.This thesis explores the inhibitory effect of high reputation underwriters on the "window dressing" behavior of R&D information of IPO companies on the Science and Technology Innovation Board,as well as their impact on IPO pricing and post IPO company value,thus enriching relevant research on underwriters’ reputation. |
PDF Full Text Request