The Research On Interest Distribution Of Farmland Transfer In China

The process of agricultural land transfer is the process of producing the interests of farmland transfer,the process of distributing the interests of farmland transfer,and the process of distributing Differential RentⅡgenerated from farmland transfer.With the rapid development of farmland transfer,there are Differential RentⅡwhich represented by grain output,agricultural subsidies,farmland transfer rent and agricultural profit,and the interests distribution participants such as the contractors and farmland operators are generated.Around Differential RentⅡ,the government,the contractors and the farmland operators compete with each other,and prominent problems of interest distribution have emerged.It is under this background that the research purpose of this paper is put forward,that is,to reveal the contradiction,mechanism and law of interest distribution in farmland transfer.In order to achieve this goal,the research constructs a game framework in which the contractors and the farmland operators,allocate Differential RentⅡgenerated from farmland transfer,hoping to solve the three main problems in farmland transfer,such as farmland transfer rent distribution mechanism,short-termism of farmland transfer and interest distribution mechanism of Differential RentⅡ.Based on the above ideas,the paper is divided into three parts,a total of 10chapters to discuss.The first part is the research basis of the paper.consists of 1～3 chapters.In the preface,the research background,purpose,thinking,content,method,problems to be solved and possible innovation of this paper are introduced.In the literature review,the previous literature on the interests and its distribution of farmland transfer is reviewed and briefly summarized.In the theoretical basis,we pass through the classical income distribution theory in the textbook,and focus on the theory that is closely related to the interest distribution of farmland transfer in China put forward in recent years,and explain it with pictures and tables.The second part of the paper is composed of 4～9 chapters,which is the core part in the paper.Firstly,the part of the paper studies the status quo of interest distribution in farmland transfer.The Chapter 4 studies the source of Differential RentⅡ,and analyze contradictions and interdependence between the interests participants.On this basis,the research studies the prominent problems of interest distribution,such as farmland transfer rent distribution mechanism,short-termism of farmland transfer and interest distribution mechanism of Differential RentⅡ.Secondly,the part of the paper make General analysis of profit distribution of farmland transfer.Chapter 5 analyze the essence of profit distribution of farmland transfer,the essence of profit distribution of farmland transfer is the distribution of Differential RentⅡgenerated from the transfer of agricultural land.Chapter 5 also analyzes the bargaining process of Differential RentⅡ between the contractor and the farmland operator.It is found that the contractor’s allocation of Differential RentⅡ depends on its bargaining power k,the probability of high returns of the operatorsη,and the magnitude of Differential RentⅡ V_O-V_L.and lastly,the chapter discusses the distribution problem of direct agricultural subsidies and points out that the farmland land protection subsidy in agricultural subsidies has become land rent.Thirdly,the part of the paper studies the distribution of Differential RentⅡunder farmland transfer.Chapter 6 studies the distribution of Differential RentⅡunder farmland transfer between individual farmers.By constructing a three-stage dynamic game model with complete information among three players,this chapter studies the law of realizing and increasing the rent from farmland transfer.Through the Stackberg game model the chapter studies a part of Differential RentⅡgenerated from scale economies of farmland is converted into farmland transfer rent because of competition among farm operators.and lastly,Through the Gounot game model the chapter studies a part of agricultural direct subsidy,as Differential RentⅡgenerated from farm transfer,is converted into farmland transfer rent because of competition among farm operators.The results show that about half of the profits of scale economy of farmland and two-thirds of the direct agricultural subsidies of operators are converted into the rent of farmland transfer.Chapter 7 studies the distribution of Differential RentⅡunder farmland transfer leaded by village collective.The essence of village collective participation in the benefit distribution of farmland transfer is the distribution of ownership to Differential RentⅡ.By constructing the tripartite cooperative distribution model of village collective,contractor and farmland operators,the distribution of cooperative interests among the three parties of ownership,contract rights and management rights is studied.The research shows that each member can obtain higher comparative income,and the tripartite cooperation has a high degree of stability.The example simulation shows that the Differential RentⅡbetween the contractor and the farmland operator is about 60:40.contractors and farmland operators share the management fee of farmland transfer for the village collective.Chapter 8 studies the comparative analysis of collective transfer and individual transfer.This chapter makes a comparative analysis of collective transfer and individual transfer from the period of the farmland transfer,rent and distribution mechanism of farmland transfer.The analysis results show that the term of collective transfer is longer and the rent of collective transfer is higher than that of individual land transfer.The tripartite cooperative distribution mechanism under collective land transfer can bring more benefits to village collective,contractors and farmland operators.Lastly,Chapter 9 is an empirical analysis of interest distribution of farmland transfer.Through three cases,this chapter empirically tests the distribution mechanism of farmland transfer rent,decision-making mechanism of grain production for farmland operators and shapley value distribution mechanism of Differential RentⅡ.The first case,through the history of farmland transfer in a village,empirically tests the realization and rising process of farmland transfer rent,and proves the realization and rising mechanism of farmland transfer rent through the production capacity of farmers,scale economy of farmland and agricultural subsidies.The second case,through several individual grain production decision cases of a village,explains the mechanism of secondary subsidies on grain production.In the third case,the shapley value distribution mechanism of cooperative game is tested by using an example of interest distribution of farmland transfer.The results show that the total value of Differential RentⅡfrom one mu is CNY 575,the distribution values of Differential RentⅡbetween the contractors and the farmland operators are CNY 337.5 and CNY 237.5.the distribution ratio between the contractors and the farmland operators is 60∶40.The third part of the paper is chapter 10.The chapter summarizes four conclusions and four suggestions are drawn.Conclusions:(1)Cooperative distribution method is a feasible interest distribution mechanism of farmland transfer.(2)The rent of farmland transfer is rising with the increase of Differential Rent II continuously.(3)Secondary subsidy is an inevitable trend.(4)Cooperation is an important method to solve the short-termism of farmland transfer.Suggestions:(1)"retire allowance"system should be implemented for older contractors.(2)A classifical farmland transfer rent system was introduced.(3)Agricultural subsidies should be radically reformed according to its purpose.(4)Strengthen the central role of the collective.The interest distribution of farmland transfer is an unavoidable topic in farmland transfer.It is the basic idea and fundamental goal of the interest distribution mechanism of farmland transfer to let a lot participants get more benefits through interest distribution.The study of this paper aims to attract more experts and scholars to the research on the interest distribution mechanism of farmland transfer and produce more richer results.