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Dynamical Analysis Of Completation And Cooperation In Duopoly Production And Price Game

Posted on:2009-11-14Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:G P ShiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2120360275450614Subject:Applied Mathematics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Based on the classic Coumot model and Bertrand model,we consider dynamic system's adjustment question about output and price under the circumstances that participants have incomplete information.The cooperation and completation is studied under the influnce of the tit-for-tat strategy.The main content is depicted as follows:1.Make a comprehensive introduction of the stability theory and the research of the the main model—Cournot model and Bertrand model in game theory.2.We consider dynamic system's adjustment question about output while participants have incomplete information.Based on the the tit-for-tat strategy,we set up the the model with the dynamic adjustment of output.Through analyzing the stability of the equilibrium points and numerical simulations,we find that,in this system the cooperation can emerge,but the stability of the adjustment system is sensitive to the parameters.After the model is improved adding the feedback control, the cooperative equilibrium of Pareto Optimality can keep stable in parameter's certain scope.3.We consider dynamic system's adjustment question about price while participants have incomplete information.The Bertrand model about price competition in duopoly game is built with the tit-for-tat strategy.Through analyzing the stability of the equilibrium points and improving the model,we study the cooperative behavior among firms.
Keywords/Search Tags:Cournot game, Bertrand game, cooperative competition, Pareto Optimality, feedback control
PDF Full Text Request
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