| In game theory, solutions of cooperative game have been always a research focus. The most extensively concerned problem in cooperative game theory is how to divide the total earnings of the grand coalition if all players cooperate. Various solution concepts have been proposed to handle these problems, including core, strongεcore, Shapley value, and so on, each kind of which satisfies a certain rational behavior and reasonable principle. As an emerging branch of game theory, fuzzy game theory has attracted many scholars' interests since the last 70's, some research results appeared one after another. The purpose of this paper is to extend mature theories of classic cooperative games to fuzzy cooperative games, convex compound fuzzy games, and repeated fuzzy cooperative games by revising and perfecting, It afford theoretic bases for players to select coalitions in the game. So it has biggish applied value and it avoid unnecessary loss because of failure in selecting coalition.Firstly this paper introduces the fuzzy core of convex compound fuzzy coalition games. Then with the way of multi-linear extension of games, the Shapley value and Banzhaf-Coleman index of convex compound fuzzy games are gained, meanwhile some axiomatic descriptions of Banzhaf-Coleman index are proposed.Secondly, on the base of two kinds of models of fuzzy cooperative games which are defined by Butnariu and Tsurmi, the strongεfuzzy core of fuzzy games are given, in the following some properties related to them are studied.Finally, introduces some basic concepts of repeated cooperative game theories first. Then expands a fuzzy n -person cooperative game with weighted function to a repeated fuzzy n -person cooperative game. In the following three axioms of the Shapley value for repeated fuzzy cooperative game are proposed, and the arithmetic formula of the Shapley value for repeated fuzzy cooperative game is gained. In the last part of paper the application of Shapley value is given by an example.
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