Moral Sentiments And Moral Practice

Scepticism can be understood as a critique of the capacities of our intellectual faculties. Taken this way, Hume is a radical, unreserved sceptic. One of Hume's greatest philosophical achievements was to destory the false opposition between reason and passion, showing passion to penetrate to the very heart of the activity of reason. Rather than seeing passions as irrational forces assaulting the mind, Hume relocates them as an essential part of human nature.The main argument of the paper is about the role of ration in Hume's justice theory. The account of justice is that in centring round the notion of property it has left out the more general and fundamental notions of fairness and equality. For Hume, justice looks to be no more than a system of rules and laws which is set up to protect people's property. The paper divides into five chapters.Chapter one Hume's position in moral philosophy,which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, asserts four theses: A. Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the slave of the passions; B. Morals are not derives from reason; C. Morals are derived from the moral sentiments; D. While some virtues and vice are natural others, including justice, are artificial.Moral sense theory was an attempt to present an alternative to both moral rationalism and to the radical egoism of Thomas Hobbes. Moral sense theorists took moral judgements to be passions. These 'sentiments' correspond to judgements of virtue and vice respectively.