Discrete Of SHCs' Property Right And Goverance

Based on the theory of property rights, the concept of "discrete" in mathematics is used in analysys of property right. Thus, we can find the problems of State holding companies (SHCs), and try to solve them.The author attributes the low efficiency of state economy to two kinds of "discrete", which are discrete principals of state property rights and discrete property rights. Principal's discrete means that property rights of state owners are implemented by different government divisions and institutions, and thus no one division or institution acts as a whole principal of state property rights. Principal's discrete gives rise to owners absence, unclearness of property rights structure, and innormality of governance structure in SHCs. We divide discrete principals of state property rights into two kinds: economic-oriented principals and noneconomic-oriented principals. The dissertation has proved with mathematical model that combining the two kinds of principals is an institutional improvement for elimination of state owners absence and clarification of property rights of SHCs. The concept of discrete property rights in real sense, which can also be an analytical method, refers to asymmetry of residual rights. And based on the concept of discrete property rights in this sense, the dissertation has developed a two-level model for analyzing property rights. The model makes it possible to study the problems of property rights and corporate governance under the same paradigm.Corporate governance are of discrete property rights. The significance of improving governance factors' function, optimizing governance mechanisms and patterns is to minimize discrete property rights of staker-holders. The transitions of governance structure from the style of shareholders domination to stake-holders cooperation can also minimize staker-holders' discrete property rights. Similarly, the designation of incentive mechanism to entrepreneur aims at minimizing entrepreneur's discrete property rights. Insider-control comes from both discrete principals and discrete property rights. Thus, reinforcing state owners' constrains to assets in SHCs is a more radical measure for eliminating insider-control.