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The Study And Application Of Venture Capital's Principal-agent Model Based On Asymmetric Information

Posted on:2004-03-13Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:S J ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2156360095452966Subject:Technical Economics and Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the globalization of economy and the acceleration of industrial structure all over the world, many countries has been paying great attention to the development of hi-tech industry. From 40s of last century, the success of venture capital in America had promoted the inversion of the hi-tech and impulsed the economy of America. As for China, the development of venture capital has great influence on the development of hi-tech industry, the upgrade of conventional industries and the transform of the mode of economy growth.The venture capital has some problems, such as low efficiency, little capital scale, no manager market of venture capital, lacking incentive & constrain mechanism, no smooth withdrawing channel of venture capital.In this article, information economics has been applied to the research of the game between investor and venture capitalist. Investor and venture capitalist forms the relationship of principal-agent. Venture capitalist has more information than the investor, which results in investor adverse selecting venture capitalist and venture capitalist's moral hazard. This article tries to study investor's agency venture due to asymmetric information and how to conquer agency risk, make income to maximization, and stimulate the venture capital market and make the venture capital industry high efficient development.This article has following achievements:(1) simulating the relationship between investor and venture capitalist as a model; (2) putting forward explicit incentive mechanism and implicit incentive mechanism; (3) applying quantitative method tomake analysis; (4) applying KMRW model to establish an implicit incentive model direct against venture capitalist; (5) applying fuzzy mathematics to design a appraisal system which can appraise the ability of venture capitalist.
Keywords/Search Tags:venture capital, asymmetric information, incentive, principal-agent.
PDF Full Text Request
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