Under The Game Theory Of The Enterprise R&D Incentive--Theory,Methods & Practice

Today, with the development of the economic society, the focus of R&D research, which started from 1980s, has changed from the lack of incentive due to the economic planning system to how to promote R&D,thus increase international competitiveness of Chinese enterprise and promote the fundamental change of the mode of economic growth .With the leadership of Von-Neumann and Oskar Morgentern,game theory is the important implement of modem economy .It can be resolve these problems which could not been resolved. In this thesis, we apply non-cooperative game, multiple- complete information dynamic game and commitment-agency theory of information game theory to establishment the incentive mechanism of enterprise R&D .Then we analyze these games and offer many feasibility policies.In this thesis, we firstly discuss the importance of enterprise R&D,by contrasting R&D inputs of domestic enterprises, we put forward the deficiency of our country .secondly, we quantitively analyze the enterprise R&D inputs. Our work is composed of: (1) By partial-analysis method and non-cooperative game ,we further research therelationship between the market structure and enterprise R&D,we conclude theoptimal market structure with and without patent. (2) By Bayesian game, we analyze the waiting game in the enterprise R&D investments. Bypatent system and enterprise R&D investments policies, we research the inside system ofenterprise R&D with R&D spillovers, we conclude the action of enterprise when the quantityof enterprise is more than two and the enterprise's action is semi-cooperative (the first stage iscooperate, the second stage is complete or cooperate) (3) By popular commitment-agency theory, we establish the new profit sharing rules betweenR&D unit and R&D people. (4) By a dynamic game model with complete information is set up, through which thecooperative games between university and enterprise, we analyze choice in theenterprise'cooperative innovation model and partners, then, we discuss how R&D uniteffect the enterprise' R&D incentive. (5) By three-stages dynamic game, we discuss a government's optimal R&D subsidy policy onthree situations: complete cooperate, semi-complete cooperate and non-cooperate. Weresearch a government's R&D subsidy policy effect the enterprise' R&D incentive.