A Study Of Enterprise Incentive Mechanism Under The Condition Of Asymmetric Information

Modern enterprise operated under two-right-separating condition will face the problem of the goal conflict. At the same time, it is impossible for the owner to weigh exactly how hard the proprietor works or how much profit his industry can brings. Then the problem of asymmetric information arises.This study concentrates on the principal and agent model of enterprise, tries to explain the presupposition and necessity of incentive mechanism, and discusses its principles, regulations, and active mode. First, is the design of incentive mechanism under the modern enterprise system. Second, the economic model in this paper is a risk model of the morals under the condition of asymmetric information(i.e. generally called the principal and agent model). The Board-Senior Managers Relationship model based on the framework is elicited, and this model is analyzed under the restraints of incentive consistent and joining. The necessity of material and spirit encouraging under the condition of asymmetric information is explained through the compare of single and multiple incentive mechanism. Last, the control and mode of the design of the incentive mechanism. At the end of this paper, the specifics of operation mode and suggestions are made.