The Research Of Credit Risk Management In China Commercial Banks Under Information Asymmetry

From 20 century 80 years on, the research center of microeconomics of banking turned its step to Information Asymmetry Model from Bank Risk Model, and Information Asymmetry Model assumes different attorney has different information as for correlative economic variables, so the attorney maybe try to gain self-interest by his information dominance.On the basis of introducing the analysis framework of information economics, this paper studies the forming mechanism of commercial banks' credit risk and the approach of keeping away and controlling credit risk, and tables a proposal on China commercial banks' credit risk management. At first, I analyze the existence, development and its framework of information economics, and introduce information asymmetry in order to explain commercial banks' credit risk. Secondly, this paper makes credit admeasure of commercial banks under information asymmetry as a masterstroke, and analyzes the adverse selection and moral hazard under information asymmetry and the common theory of credit admeasure. Combining the fact of China commercial banks. 1 analyze the adverse selection and moral hazard in China commercial banks' credit risk management.Then, this paper analyzes how to strengthen China commercial banks' credit risk management using information asymmetry, and suggests that, one way is to improve information symmetry degree in the credit activity, and the other is to establish inner prompting and restriction .mechanism of bank, and the last is to throw daylight on commercial bank information. Finally, by 2001 Basel new capital agreement, it analyzes the actuality and problem of China commercial banks' interior appraisement and the approach to establish China commercial banks' interior appraisement.