At present, Chinese state-owned enterprises mainly adopt the west-oriented corporate governance structure pattern based on the separation of the management rights and the ownership. However, the kind of governance structure pattern contributing greatly to the economic development of the west has brought some disastrous effects: the deficit of the SOE and the losses of state-owned assets. Some scholars believe that the "Insider Control" results in the losses of state-owned assets. But what is the essential reason for "Insider Control"? How to solve these problems thoroughly? This paper analyzes the fundamental reasons why the governance structure pattern based on the physical assets does not conform to the SOE in China — the vacancy of the state-hold shares owners. Moreover, I put forward the innovative "Virtual Employee Stock Program" aiming at amending the defect of the SOE pattern in China at present on the basis of the human capital theories. It differs from the Employee Stock Owner Plans and Virtual Stock introduced directly from the west and accords with the vacancy of the SOE owners of China. This program allows the staff to share the firm residual profits and undertake the corresponding risks at the same time without having the ownership of the enterprise. The paper not only puts forward the calculating mode of the Virtual Employee Stock Owner and accounting management methods, but also analyzes the feasibility and necessity in the practice with the concrete cases.
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