On Entrepreneur Property Rights Institutions

Entrepreneur is the owner of heterogenetic human capital as well as the original property rights main-body of it. The property rights owned by entrepreneur himself are called entrepreneur property rights, which include the rights of use, gains and transfer. During the process of its use, heterogenetic human capital is only to be encouraged, but not to be oppressed. Moreover, its transfer is uneasily to be observed and its gains are tremendous. Accordingly, if there are no scientific entrepreneur property rights institutions to regulate and restrain the acts of entrepreneur, the entrepreneur property rights will be imperfect, hence, the phenomenon of position-out of entrepreneur. We deem that the fundamental reason for the inefficiency of the country-owned enterprises reform in China is that no scientific entrepreneur property rights institutions are established. Therefore, the establishment of them to ensure the position-in of entrepreneur has become an important task not only in theory but also in practice in China. At present, the research for entrepreneur property rights institutions is still a virgin place, while in China the theories about them aren't systematic and synthetical. Being based on the natural requests of the connotation of entrepreneur property rights, this thesis first creatively and explicitly classifies entrepreneur property rights institutions into three parts: entrepreneur market institution, benefit institution and useinstitution. Proceeding from this, some models are set up, namely the adverse selection model for market institution, property rights encouragement model for benefit institution and supervision -transaction model for use institution. Then these models are used to analyse the inherent problems in the entrepreneur property rights institutions in China. At last, the thesis points out that the key to solve these problems lies in the set-up of manager-possessing institution and puts forward some concrete solutions.