The Empirical Research On Ownership Structure And Corporate Performance Of Listed Companies In Hebei Province

Ownership structure is the interior structure of corporate owners, which then determines the corporate governance. The efficiency of corporate governance is embodied by the corporate performance. Only optimal corporate governance can guarantee perfect corporate performance while only optimal ownership structure can promote corporate governance. In Hebei Province, most of the listed companies stem from restructured state-owned enterprises, so they have special ownership structure. This paper analyzes the correlation between ownership structure and corporate performance of listed companies in Hebei Province qualitatively and quantitatively by means of statistics and econometrics methods. At the beginning, this article uses descriptive statistics method to analyze trade status and ownership status of listed companies. Some conclusions are given: Firstly, listed companies of Hebei province are mostly in the traditional trade such as metallurgy, mechanism, petrochemical and textile etc. So the style of work is comparatively sane and risk factor is small, profit ability is higher than the average national level. But on the other hand this reflects listed companies in Hebei Province are lack of vigor and growing ability. Secondly, through analyzing the ownership structure in recent years of Hebei province, this paper analyzes features of stock ownership of the listed companies: (l)Hebei Province's listed companies have over-concentrated ownership structures. The largest stockholder's ownership proportion (CR1) is more than 58%. In 60% of listed companies the largest stockholders are state-hold shares. Such kind of ownership structure that state-hold shares is over-centralized leads to the coexist of the invasion-of-interest and the convergence-of-interest. (2)The un-circulating shares is in dominant status which makes it difficult for medium and small stockholder to effect corporate management. (3) In sharp contrast with state-hold shares, the corporation-hold share is 10% averagely during the period from 1997 to 2002. The extremely low proportion is no good for legal stockholders to play a role as "active supervisor" in corporate governance. Next the article use multi-linear regression method and several variables reflecting ownership structure and performance to process public data on annuals. Several conclusions have been drawn from the empirical result.: There is s relationship between the ownership concentration degree and company performance, but not significant. This is the same as the proportion of state-owned shares. While there is no significant relationship between the company performance and the proportion of corporation shares and circulation shares. At last according to the conclusions the relevant suggestion is that ownership dispersal shouldn't be advocated at the moment and proper ownership concentration will help improve corporate performance. In addition, the proportion of corporate shares should be improved so that they can play an active role in corporate governance.