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Game Analysis Of Contract Designing On The Third-Party Logistics

Posted on:2005-06-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:T S XieFull Text:PDF
GTID:2156360125453160Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The third-party logistics (TPL) is one of important transforms in the world economy field when 21rd century is coming, and one of important trends of our national economy in the new century. It is very significant to promote the national economy to develop, and improve the quality of whole economy. Though logistics industry in China has been from the stage of start into the stage of development, it is still slowly going ahead. It is one of the most important reasons that there is not right contract to guide and bind their behaviors between the service provider and the demander. Because of this, the core task in this thesis is to design a trade mechanism between the two traders, which can lead to a win-to-win or/and general-win result. First, we analyze three characters of the supply-demand relationship, which are protracted nature, reciprocal nature and contractual nature, after we differentiate and analyze the concept of the third-party logistics. At some extent, these characters restrict and decide which behavior a trader will adopt in a trade, and are the primary bases of designing a right trade mechanism. Second, we analyze several kinds of factors, which impact contract designing, such as property, information, trade and behavior characteristics, and them how to work. As a result, we consider that a contract should be designed out, which can distinguish a service provider's abilities, self-enforce, and include a long-term adjustment time mechanism. Third, we briefly explain TPL's economic essences, economic effects, and economic boundaries, so that we can base the contract designing onto more abundant presuppositions. At last, we design the object contract by adopting some microeconomic approaches, such relatively static state analysis, and game analysis and so on. In the first place, we analyze all kinds of situations that a provider or a demander can meet under the condition of abundant and symmetric information, and show their special tactics in these situations and possible game equilibriums. Then we analyze respectively under the condition of asymmetric information when one has full negotiation power while the other has his confidant information, the one puts forward optimal contract for him to the other. And finally, we consider the two respective optimal contracts to them at the same time and draw a new contract which is right to them and can be adjusted along its enforcement from a period to another period. At this moment, we have constructed the object contract. This research yet indicates that, if the provider and the demander can focus their core competition capabilities respectively and actively perform their responsibilities, they can not only realize the relationship of win-to-win on the basis of labor division but also the relationship of general-win on the basis of labor collaboration.
Keywords/Search Tags:third party logistics, contract designing, game analysis
PDF Full Text Request
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