An Emipirical Analyses On The Finacining Efficiency Of Listed Companies' Right Offerings In China

Right offering is often a main re-financing means of listed companies in China. During the past several years, the investors often regard the right offering as good news. Recently, however, the market is not favor of right offerings. Just the market's reactions stir the author's research on the financing efficiency of listed companies' right offering in China. Whether the efficiency is high or low? What's the main factors influencing the fund efficiency? And how to lead the fund to companies which really need and could bring a better revenues? The paper outspreads an empirical analyses on the financing efficiency with these issues.The thesis begins with the actuality of listed companies' rights financing bias in China, and analyses the reason of the bias, the distribute of equities when right offers, then propose two supposes:Suppose 1: As the majority-stock-holders' equity is negative correlation to the participate extent and positive correlation to the price of the right offering, the majority-stock-holders will quit from the right offering and the price will be gradually higher.Suppose 2: The signal from the majority-stock-holders' low subscribe indicates the long-run performance will be not optimism under the special stock structure in China if the suppose 1 comes into existence.In part 3, the statistics about the listed companies' right offering proved the suppose 1. In part 4, to examine the suppose 2, we empirically analyses the listed companies' right offering fund with payoff ability index, market index, cash current index, stock-holder's equity index, general asset index. And the outcomes partly support the suppose 2, that is, though the efficiency is not so good, the other indexes are just good. And we analyses the factors affect the financing fund efficiency with the majority-stock-holder's participant extent, character, and the industry status, the interval of several financing time, etc.The research proves the stock market is a typical financing type market, we believe that listed companies do gain money by cheating. We consider that this bases on following three reasons. One side is the irrationality corporate governance structure of Chinese listed companies, other is the inefficacy marketable of the policy, third is the ineffective supervise. So in conclusion part, we provide three advice, such as to improve the corporate governance structure and inhibit listed companies' conduct; strengthen the marketable of right offering policy; and strengthen exterior supervise on right offering.