Research On Collusion In Multiple-unit Auction

As a commercial exchange mechanism, auction has been widely used since ancient times. In many auction markets, bidders may collude so that they can get the goods with low prices at the expense of the auctioneers. So, the emergence of the collusion will influence the competition in the market and obstacle the development of the market. The research on collusion has a significant meaning.In this dissertation, based on the electricity market, we analyze how the asymmetry between firms impacts the collusion in uniform price auction from the aspect of two capacity constraint firms. Meanwhile, we point out the existence and unique of the equilibrium in different conditions so that we can do some comparative analysis.This dissertation is outlined as follows: the origin, main topics and mechanism of the auction is presented in Chapter 1, then outcome the problems of the collusion, including the collusion in private value auction, common value auction and the stability of the collusion. Chapter 2 enumerates some of the papers about problems in auctions recently at home and abroad. The detailed theoretical model is presented in Chapter 3. Using the methods of game theory and mechanical design theory, we discuss the influence of the collusion on the choice of the strategy both of the bidder and the seller. Chapter 4 focuses on the collusion in practice, mainly in auction market of government securities and electricity. In the last Chapter, we discuss the problem that can avoid or obstacle the implementation of the collusion and bring forward some policy implications and countermeasures.