The Research On Agency Problem Between Controlling Shareholders And Minority Stockholders Of Listed Companies

In recent years, the case that the controlling shareholders encroach on minority stockholders' interests is emerging constantly in our country's capital market, and it causes people to concern themselves with the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority stockholders. If you make a general survey of existing relevant researches, however, you will find most of them emphasize only one aspect of the problem and have not formed a set of complete systems on the whole. In view of the particularity of the ownership structure in our country and the deficiency in relevant legal protections, the interest conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority stockholders in our listed companies is more complicated than those of other countries. So, it is of great theoretical and realistic meanings for us to study this agency problem systematically.In fact, most enterprises' ownerships are not highly dispersed but quite concentrated in the world, therefore the focus of the agency problem, which is caused by the separation between ownership and control, turns from interest conflicts between owners and managers to those between controlling shareholders and minority stockholders. As we know, corporate governance is the mechanism by which outside investors can prevent their rights being robbed by insiders, and its perfection degrees determine whether the behavioral restriction, which is against controlling shareholders' encroachment on interests, is effective or not. On the basis of the ownership structure and legal protection's determination effects on the corporate governance's operational efficiency, we think these two things are the basic institutional factors which influence companies' controlling shareholders' behaviors. And this provides a starting point for us to solve the agency problem between controlling shareholders and in minority stockholders. When it comes to the capital market in China, we find that the controlling shareholders' robbery of minority stockholders is the most serious agency problem. At the same time, the investigation of our controlling shareholders' abilities and motives to encroach, which is based on ownership structure and legal protection, has also proved that our key agency problem exists between controlling shareholders and minority stockholders presently. Finally, this thesis provides several suggestions respectively from the points of view of corporate governance' micro aspects and external mechanisms, namely the optimization of ownership structure and legal protection.The thesis combines the knowledge of finance, economics and laws, trying to innovate in the following aspects : (1)According to the mode of the agency problem between the owners and managers under Berle-Means' proposition, the thesis analyses exhaustively the key agency problem of concentrated companies, that is to say the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority stockholders; (2)By applying the influencing factors in the model of LLSV to all corporate governance mechanisms, this thesis analyses the restriction relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and controlling shareholders' behaviors from the angel of economic feasibility, and then puts forward that legal protection and ownership structure are the key institutional factors in solving the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority stockholders.