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The Effect Of Peasants' Institutional Prefer On The Establishment Of Rural Land Policies

Posted on:2006-12-27Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Q Z ZhaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2156360152488501Subject:Forestry Economics and Management
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Rural land institution is the cardinal and elemental one in rural system, whose development has close relation to the development of the country's whole system. With different land institutional prefer and perspective due to different position, land institutional development is a gaming process of governments' and peasants' competitive behaviors which has a co-operative basic. As microscopic producer, peasants inevitably have proprietary claim to plough land, which should be fully respect to by government when establishing rural land policy. In a game theory analysis framework, the solving strategy of this problem will be found: facing the different institutional prefer, government should choose what policies to gain its own goal and not to frustrate the peasant's activeness.Through investigation to a traditional agricultural region in Mei county of Shanxi province, by numerical analysis means of orthogonal select, the different colonial spesificnesse of the variant peasants' colonies that have different institutional preferences. The quantitative influential degrees of factors have gained, the factors order of influential ability from strong to weak is that income level, land occupation level, age and educated level. For the reason that the institutional preference result of Mei County should be value, AHP is used to calculate the consentient ratio of establishment of land private processions and the ratio is 64 percent. When making a rural land institutional decision, a peasant will principally take his economic benefit, fair-mindedness and insurance into account, which is course of the profound motivation that they have been aware of the inequalities in social status and power and future developing opportunity.Based on the study mentioned above, the conclusion of analysis to the beneficial variation of government in altering patterns of rural land property rights is that only the inequalities of peasants in social status and power and future developing opportunity have been eliminated by the profiting policies in all social field, should the contradiction in rural land institutional field be solve. Furthermore, some advise to future policies' establishment have also been gain, including policies of stabilization and intensification of rural land contract, the establishment and perfection of rural social insurance system and financial system, and set-up and development the education system which is down-to-earth to direct to peasants, agriculture and countryside. And the final one is the fundamental solve to the rural land institutional problem and China rural development.
Keywords/Search Tags:institutional prefer, rural land policy, game theory, orthogonal select, AHP
PDF Full Text Request
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