| As the pace of BANK OF CHINA LIMITED (BOC in short) going to the capital market, the corporate governance and inner operating system are in the front. As is a very important part of the inner operating system, the loan management system should also be regarded carefully. After the separation of Bank of China form the People's Bank of China in 1979, BOC has carried out the function of "sub-finance". As the BOC is owned by the Chinese government, its corporate governance is to some extent not clear, and the ability to control the risk is weak, and caused giant amount of non-performing assets. After the Chinese government added the owner's equality and made provisions for bad and doubtful debts, the financial status of the BOC was getting better, but the reason that caused the giant amount of non-performing assets was not resolved. Today BOC must clarify its corporate governance and inner operating system and strength its ability in controlling the risk to win this "never fail" reform and the competition against the foreign banks. The purpose of the thesis is to analysis the problem of the loan risk management, brings forward a new loan risk management system, and radically changes the mechanism of producing the non-performing assets, sets up the effective loan-risk-control system. Based on the demonstration analysis of the real affairs, the thesis brings forward a new loan risk system and analysis the result of the new one. At the beginning of the article, the definition of the loan management system is defined as three parts which are related to one another to make up a whole system: one is the organization framework; loan policies and the loan examine and approve order in the system level. The thesis researches the loan management system in a mode that is bringing forward the problems, analysis them, then putting forward a new system. The thesis first discussed the effects the property right and the corporate governance placed on the loan management system. The article discusses the influence in three points of views: one is the non-exist of the real proprietors, BOC is owned by the Chinese government, but this did not lead to a clear property right and the corporate governance. In contrast, many ministries and commissions of the Chinese government have the right to supervise the operation of BOC, but there are no ministries and commissions which takes the responsibility of the fail in the operation of the BOC. The writer's suggestion is that this truth is to be stopped as soon as possible, the government should definitude the real proprietor of BOC, let the real owner supervise the operation of BOC, to maximum the interests of the proprietor. The second view is the functions of the BOC are not clear. As a special enterprise, the BOC should set maximum the profits as its goal, but this is not the case. The BOC acts its function as the "sub-finance" department. The writer' opinion is that BOC should definite the functions between an finance enterprise and a "sub-finance" department, to develop the function as an finance enterprise, and to decrease and minimum the function as a "sub-finance" department in the normal run of economic circle. The third point is the twist of the promptings on the administer level. The thesis indicates that the promptings at present are mainly the official level in the government which would lead to wrong decision and low finance efficiency. The writer' opinion is that the official levels the administrators in BOC bear should be abolished, increase the promptings' level, enrich the prompting manners, foster and set up the "banks' market", to make sure the managers of BOC will focus their attention on the operation of the bank and resist the temptation of corruption. The principle of the loan management system is "unification loan-lending policy, the separation of examine and lend, examine and lend the loan depending on different grades, clear right and duty", the core of the principle is he separation of examine and lend, so to speak, the right of loan examina...
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