Culture And Ideology In China's Relations With Latin America

This thesis is about the basic theoretical framework of Constructivism and the way in which this perspective can be applied to explaining China's contemporary relations with Latin America. It parts from four assumptions. First, China is a state-civilization that has survived roughly in its political and territorial form until the present day. Second, the particular identity, norms, historical experience and institutions developed throughout the history of China are elements that configured a Strategic Culture. Third, the success of China's continuity as a unitary political and cultural actor is mainly due to the efficacy of its strategic culture in dealing with external security threats of Asian and European powers. Four, China's socialization in the international system from theⅪⅩth century is a product of its own strategic ideation rather than a forceful imposition and replacement of domestic ideas for western political institutions. With this is mind, the research argues that the history of political and economic relations with Latin America has been a product of China's strategic culture in guiding and taking full advantage of the West's ideological language and political institutions to which China has adapted under different ideological colors as a way to influence the region according to the basic cultural notions of its vision of the world order. In this order of ideas, the role of Latin America as a provider of key resources for domestic development and building of national power together with the language of a tacit political and south-south ideological alliance could be interpreted as an illustration of the desirable behavior of China according to a Confucian and Sino centric view of the world. The dissertation is divided in 5 chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 aim at establishing the basis for the argument that Chinese culture, as described in chapter 3, still has a determinant role in modern day Chinese foreign policy to Latin America through a combination of western institutional discourse, cautious ideological emphasis and strong trade ties; all which are reviewed in chapters 4 and 5.The purpose of Chapter 1 is to establish the conceptual framework of the research. It describes the main concepts of the literature of Constructivism of Alexander Wendt, Gerard Ruggie and Christian Reus-Smith and of March and Olsen's International Institutionalism. Later it is established an expanded definition of Strategic Culture based of the work of Alastair Johnston and two contributing authors of his thesis. The conceptual body of the research is framed on Constructivist's assumptions that identities determine for actors a standard of appropriate behavior or Norms -or Institutions when in its operational form. An Institution is understood as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations. Norms pose a logic of Appropriateness, or that in which actors internalize roles and rules as scripts to which they conform. These then dictate preferences and these in turn, behavior. Norms are promoted by their entrepreneurs and may or not reach a universal appeal. Because of norms, culture explains differences in behavior among societies and states when facing similar circumstances. Strategic Culture is the bridge between state action and culture. Alastair Johnston's definition of Strategic Culture is and integrated system of symbols which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in inter-state political affairs and by clothing those conceptions with an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious. Robert Scobell expands this definition to the multidimensional aspects of culture as interrelated parts of one single statecraft structure. In that regard, looking at statecraft strategic culture, one has to do it in relation to the other dimensions. The chapter concludes explaining the applications and methodological limitations of the Constructivist approach in International Relations.Chapter 2 looks at the case of China's integration in the International system of the last two centuries. The main premise is that China's socialization in the international system during the occupation of European powers in theⅪⅩth century was the product of China's own understanding and dealing of the security situation through its own strategic culture rather than of the forceful imposition and assimilation of European institutions. In turn, China took advantage of these institutions through a strategy of Organized Hypocrisy for maintaining the traditions of its own political institutions. It is argued that later in the cold war and its aftermath a similar strategic culture of employing foreign institutional language -Marxism and later Liberalism- was displayed and allowed China to effectively occupy its place in the international system. The second part discusses under the Realist approach the debate around the problem of the Rise of China after the cold war and its skepticism towards the role of Chinese culture in setting paths of action for dealing with security threats. Third part looks at examples of the presence of elements of tradition and continuity of political institutions in China's Foreign Policy behavior in the XXth Century. These elements are:Sovereignty, Centrality, self-image of greatness, Authority and State PowerChapter 3 reviews the observations and descriptions of different authors of instances of a distinctive Chinese strategic culture. It is held that as the constructivist approach assumes, strategic thought in China has been influenced culturally by a correlative view of metaphysical or natural laws that rule its vision of the world that differ from the West's cultural, philosophical and strategic mindset construct. In general, Chinese actions tend to be broad, long-termed, prefer relative rather than absolute gains and is involving rather than violent or confrontations. Derived from this notion of mindset singularity, Shi, Identity and strategy are cultural elements of China's Foreign policy that interplay in decision making. The basic idea of Shi is the understanding of the overall configuration of power and the direction or tendency of the process of change in which an actor acts and interacts. Identity refers to who an actor is and how its interests are determined, and constitutes a property of intentional actors that generates their motivational and behavioral disposition. Strategy refers to how national interests and goals can be realized within international society. The second part looks at the presence of Confucianism as part of identity in past and current political culture.Chapter 4 examines China's relations with Latin America in the framework of Beijing's political and ideological categorization of the region as part of The Developing World. It looks at the patterns of engagement with Latin America through China's changing ideological focus. Maoism and Marxist interpretations of the international system are no longer the prism through which China establishes a role for Latin America. Relations with the region are primarily driven by the need of natural resources and energy for domestic development leaving ideological considerations in diplomatic language. In that regard, relations between the two regions are largely built on Liberalism. Beijing finds contending the United States in the region as an alternative with no utility for its construction of the image as a peaceful global power. In that light, it takes a cautious approach to leftist revisionist and anti-US regimes in the region.Chapter 5 analyses the role, characteristics and contradictions of China's ideological discourse, narratives and rhetoric in Foreign Policy. It sustains that Beijing uses its own narrative for creating its role and responsibility as a great power in the world. Peaceful Rise and the Five Principles of Pacific Coexistence denote a strategy for global governance and a desire to redesign the global structures of International Relations that employs this language. Second part sustains that in spite of China's rising status as a power, its discursive and official identification as part of the Developing world, colored by normative language of Cooperation, alliance, association, partnership and peaceful ruse, shows a tension between the normative view contained in this identification and its actual behavior as a growing power, reflected in the frequent trade disputes with the region, the center-periphery division that is starting to be visible, and its need of showing bargaining capacity in favor of its economic interests in front of the US in the WTO. On the other hand, China's presence in multilateral organizations provides Latin America and the Developing World. Lastly, some conclusions are provided.