Constitutional Supremacy Or Legislative Supremacy

The development of the Singapore Constitution after World War II shows that the path of the evolution of the Singapore Constitution was affected by the pragmatic attitude of the government: to assure the political stability, racial harmonies, economic prosperity in Singapore instead of carry out the check and balance and separation of power contained of constitutionalism. In Singapore, constitution becomes a tool for governing the country, providing political legitimacy instead of restricting the government itself.In such conditions, the supremacy clause in the Singapore Constitution is full of paradox. In fact, if we look back on the historical and legal circumstances surrounding the emergence of Singapore Constitution, and then compare them with the grundnorm (if one is Kelsenian) or ultimate rule of recognition (if one is Hartian), we will find that at the time of independence, the Singapore Parliament exercised legislative powers in a manner which lay down constitutional provisions by passing an Act, then assumed the mantle of supremacy in Singapore. The Constitution is not the grundnorm, but merely a manifestation of the grundnorm. The grundnorm is the supremacy of the legislature.In the context of"legislative supremacy", what role should Singapore judiciary act and whether the courts have the power of judicial review are the key criteria to discriminate the form and essence of the position of Singapore Constitution. Though the Constitution does not expressly vest such powers to declare legislative or executive Acts invalid in the courts, the judiciary has assumed the power and duty to ensure that the provisions of the Constitution are observed by necessary implication from Article 4, the supremacy clause.However, Singapore courts'deference to the Parliament and political will impacts upon their fidelity to the Constitution, in particular, the protection of fundamental liberties. Furthermore, Parliament always wants to limit the courts'power of judicial review. One serious attack to the courts is enactment and constitutional amendments to oust or exclude the court's review powers over the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts. Though the courts always keep vigilant and have sought to flex its judicial muscle, they can only use judicial interpretation in the vested framework instead of looking forward to challenge the legislative power of Parliament. There however appears to be a slight shift in judicial philosophy in recent years, which shows into the courts'willingness to consider customary international law.