Research On Incentive And Constraint Mechanism Of Stock Options In The State-Owned Enterprises

ESO has been proved to be an efficient long-term incentive mechanism in theory and practice. ESO can play an important role in solving the escalating principal-agent problem in the SOE. This dissertation focuses mainly on the tentative design of the ESO in Chinese SOE. First, pointing out the problems to which we should pay attention in the practice of the ESO in Chinese SOE by analyzing the particularity of principal-agent relations and the demand of incentive mechanism in SOE and the different condition of ESO between china and foreign countries. Then, researching the incentive and constraint mechanism of stock options which both accords with the SOE's concrete conditions and effectively avoid the negative effect through deep objective analysis of the obstacle of our practice of ESO and the causes and exhibition of the ESO's negative effects. At last, improving the research by the discussion on how to design the long-term incentive project of non-listed SOE and construct the effective supervising system and establish the correlative measure and condition of ESO.ESO is still an effective long-term incentive mechanism to solve the principal-agent problem now before finding a better one. It is important that we should consider the concrete external environment and internal condition of SOE and how to effectively avoid the negative effect having been discovered in the western practice of ESO, during the designing and practice of the ESO of SOE.