| The paper proceeds from the different patterns of factual cognizance between Anglo-American legal system and continental legal system. It finds out something in common between them. That is, the judge's psychological progress to the factual cognizance and fact and law's inosculation, according to which the author puts it forward as a factual presumption impersonally. Following such kind of train of thought, the author, first of all, probes into fact and law, which is an old and new question, analyses how their interfluves began and how they blend in practice, and points out the meaning that such relationship causes to factual cognizance. Then the author shows personal opinion towardsthe attitudes of treating facts, here on a visual angle's transition happens------from ontologyto epistemology, which makes us pay more attention to the judgment of facts. Factual cognizance depends on the judgment of evidences; therefore, it is necessary to censor the evidential ability, to appraise the testimonial power, and to evaluate the evidences synthetically. This is an outspreading process gradually to evidential judgment while maintaining the facts. This article makes new corrections to some traditional opinions related to that process. The analyses above aim at providing maneuverable suggestions to the judges during maintaining the facts. In conclusion, the author puts forward two responses: In principal, the judge should be familiar with the law; in epistemology, factual cognizance must be external. The author hopes such analysis can emblaze this field, whichis ambiguous but is not open------the process of factual cognizance. Also it can providesome consultative suggestions. |